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AN INTRODUCTION TO
LINGUISTICS

TAUFIK HIDAYAH

AN INTRODUCTION TO

LINGUISTICS

**Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia
Nomor 28 Tahun 2014
Tentang Hak Cipta**

Lingkup Hak Cipta

Pasal 8:

Hak ekonomi merupakan hak eksklusif Pencipta atau Pemegang Hak Cipta untuk mendapatkan manfaat ekonomi atau Ciptaan

Pasal 9:

- (1) Pencipta atau Pemegang Hak Cipta sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 8 memiliki hak ekonomi untuk melakukan:
 - a. Penerbitan Ciptaan;
 - b. Penggandaan Ciptaan dalam segala bentuknya;
 - c. Penerjemahan Ciptaan;
 - d. Pengadaptasian, pengaransemenan, atau pentransformasian Ciptaan;
 - e. Pendistribusian Ciptaan atau salinannya;
 - f. Pertunjukan Ciptaan;
 - g. Pengumuman Ciptaan;
 - h. Komunikasi Ciptaan;
 - i. Penyewaan Ciptaan.
- (2) Setiap Orang yang melaksanakan hak ekonomi sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) wajib mendapatkan izin Pencipta atau Pemegang Hak Cipta.
- (3) Setiap Orang yang tanpa izin Pencipta atau Pemegang Hak Cipta dilarang melakukan Penggandaan dan/atau Penggunaan Secara Komersial Ciptaan.

Ketentuan Pidana

Pasal 113:

- (1) Setiap Orang dengan tanpa hak melakukan pelanggaran hak ekonomi sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 9 ayat (1) huruf i untuk Penggunaan Secara Komersial dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling lama 1 (satu) tahun dan/atau pidana denda paling banyak Rp. 100.000.000,00 (seratus juta rupiah).
- (2) Setiap Orang yang dengan tanpa hak dan/atau tanpa izin Pencipta atau Pemegang Hak Cipta melakukan pelanggaran hak ekonomi Pencipta sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 9 ayat (1) huruf c, huruf d, huruf f, dan/atau huruf h untuk Penggunaan Secara Komersial dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling lama 3 (tiga) tahun dan/atau pidana denda paling banyak Rp. 500.000.000,00 (lima ratus juta rupiah).
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- (4) Setiap Orang yang memenuhi unsur sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (3) yang dilakukan dalam bentuk pembajakan, dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling lama 10 (sepuluh) tahun dan/atau pidana denda paling banyak Rp. 4.000.000.000,00 (empat miliar rupiah).

AN INTRODUCTION TO

LINGUISTICS

TAUFIK HIDAYAH



2019

An Introduction to Linguistics

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Jember, July 2019

The Writer

About the Book

The following text gives a full introduction to Linguistics. It begins with a discussion on language and its origin as well as linguistics. It turns next to the study of language and how it evolves from traditional grammar to generative linguistics. The next two chapters talk about the study of the distinctive sounds of English (phonology) and the analysis of the structure of English words and their classification (morphology) as well as the classification of English words and their grammatical modification. The next section is taken up with a detailed analysis of English sentence structure (syntax) from a generative perspective. This is followed by an exploration of the meaning of English words (semantics). The text then considers the functions and contexts of language use (pragmatics). Finally, the last chapter of the book discusses about language variations, either user-related variations or use-related variations.

This textbook is addressed to intermediate undergraduate students interested in English Linguistics, including those whose primary area of interest is English as a second language, primary or secondary-school English education, English literature, theoretical and applied linguistics. For this reason, this textbook emphasizes on the theory of linguistics and all the related disciplines under the term linguistics.

Furthermore, the text does not assume any background in language or linguistics. Students are required to learn the International Phonetic Alphabet as well as the technical vocabulary of grammar and linguistics, but all necessary terms and concepts are presented in the text.

Upon completion of this textbook and accompanying workbook, students will have acquired the following:

1. An understanding of the term language and its theory of origin;
2. A comprehension on the term linguistics and its development from time to time;
3. A knowledge of the sound system of contemporary English;
4. An understanding of the formation of English words and of their grammatical modification;
5. A comprehension of the structure of both simple and complex sentences in English;
6. A recognition of complexities in the expression of meaning, on both the word and sentence level;
7. An understanding of the effects of context and function of use upon the structure of the language; and
8. A knowledge on the language variations in real life environment;

The textbook is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 briefly examines the nature of human language, its origin, and linguistics and its disciplines. Chapter 2 discusses about the development of linguistics from traditional grammar to generative linguistics. The next chapter, chapter 3, studies phonetics, phonology, and the consonant and vowel sounds of English. Chapter 4 explores the internal structure of words, the concept of the morpheme (meaningful unit of a language), and the varied processes of word formation in English. Chapter 5 treats the syntax of the simple and complex sentence, looking at the internal structure of the noun, adjective,

adverb, and prepositional phrase, complement structures in the verb phrase. Chapter 6 surveys a number of traditional and structural approaches to word meaning and includes a discussion on sense relations between words. Chapter 7 talks about pragmatics and the role of context and presuppositions. The last chapter, chapter 8, mainly discusses the variations of language that exist in human society.

Table of Contents

v	Acknowledgement
vi	About the Book
ix	Table of Contents
1	CHAPTER 1 – The Nature Of Language and Linguistics
40	CHAPTER 2 – The Study of Language
56	CHAPTER 3 – Phonetics and Phonology, the Study of Sounds and Phonemes
70	CHAPTER 4 – Morphology, the Study of Morphemes and Words
80	CHAPTER 5 – Syntax, the Study of The Structured Phrases and Sentences
93	CHAPTER 6 – Semantics, the Study of Meaning
104	CHAPTER 7 – Pragmatics, the Study of Language Use in Particular Situations
112	CHAPTER 8 – Language Variation
120	Bibliography
124	Glossary
134	Index
137	About the Writer

The Nature of Language and Linguistics

1.1 Language: A Wonder of Natural World

As a species, we are all gifted with a remarkable ability; to be able to direct and share events in each other's brain with great precision. What we have in our "pocket" is not some kind of magic, telepathy or even mind control. It is the ability to use language that helps us to do that. Simply saying, language is mean of communication. Edward Sapir (1921) believes that language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of voluntarily produced symbols. Language experts, without any doubt, would agree that language is a "method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of voluntarily produced symbols". But the problem here is the word "non-instinctive" used in Sapir's definition of language. Nowadays, many language experts believe language is indeed instinctively learned by us, humans. Language comes so naturally that we tend to forget how miraculous it really is. Language is very much integrated in our life that is impossible for us to live without it. Even when we are alone and have

no one to talk with, we tend to speak to ourselves, our pets, or even our plants. Humans with normal access to natural language learn their language in the first few years of their lives. The knowledge itself is mostly acquired unconsciously. Very young children know how to form grammatical structures, such as relative clauses. They also learn that relative clauses often have a modifying function. But do they know that it is a relative clause? Do they also know what relative clauses are used for? For all these two questions, the answer is NO. Let's study the following example:

"I want the toy that the little boy is playing with."

A child (English native) could utter the above fully formed sentence with a relative clause ("that the little boy is playing with") without knowing the function of relative clause "that" (or other relative clauses) and not having the ability to break down that sentence into its component parts. Thus, we can conclude that the ability to acquire and use a language is mostly unconscious.

A language is a linguistic code, which its speakers know and use, and which manifests itself in its speakers' linguistic knowledge and in the actual utterances that its speakers make in linguistic communication. Consequently, language can be regarded as existing in essentially two modes. On the one hand it can be looked upon as a body of objective facts (strings of sounds or letters) produced and perceived by its users in linguistic communication. On the other hand, it can be regarded as the language users' knowledge which makes linguistic communication possible, an internal property of the human mind. One of the greatest figures in modern linguistics, Noam Chomsky, has called these two modes of

language Externalized Language (E-language) and Internalized Language (I-language), respectively.

The dominant kind of language study in the first half of the 20th century, Structuralist Linguistics, concentrated on E-language. It aimed at collecting samples of E-language, i.e. samples of the actual products of linguistic communication, as objects independent of the mind, and then describing the regularities (patterns, structures) found in those samples. Since then, however, the interest and emphasis of language study has shifted to I-language, i.e. to the knowledge that native speakers of a language possess and use when they communicate linguistically. Generative Linguistics aims at modelling the I-language of the native speaker, i.e. his/her linguistic knowledge or internal grammar.

All languages in this world share the same features (see Figure 1.1) in their mechanism (Brown et.al, 2014). These organizational mechanisms contribute in distinguishing them from other form of communication that is developed by other species such as animals and insects.

Figure 1.1 Eight Design Features of Languages

Double Articulation	Language applies small number of sounds (less than 50 in most languages) that are combined to form large but finite number of words, which can be combined into infinite number of sentences.
Productivity	Language can produce novel sentences that has never been used before.

Arbitrariness	There is no necessary connection between sound and meaning. The meaning of dog and the word dog are connected arbitrarily as proven by the word chien (French) or anjing (Indonesia) which express roughly the same meaning.
Interchangeability	An individual can both be a speaker or a listener in a language communication.
Displacement	Language can be used to talk about things that are not present or do not exist. Language can even be used to lie.
Discreteness	The differences between language units are of an all or nothing kind. For instance, a sound cannot be heard as something in between a b or p sound.
Specialization	Speaking only requires a limited part of the speaker's attention/behavior and is independent of its context.
Cultural transmission	Not all aspects of language are innate, some are taught after birth and differ according to the culture the child is lived in.

1.2 Linguistics Concept

The word “Linguistics” is derived from a Latin word *lingua*, which simply means language. Thus, Linguistics is the study of language. More precisely, **Linguistics** is the scientific study of human language. The word “scientific” is used in the definition because people who work in the field of linguistics are all scientists and they use a scientific method (research) to find answers for all the questions in linguistics area. Simply speaking, linguistics seeks to answer these three BIG questions:

1. What exactly do we know when we know a language? (Competence)
2. How is this knowledge acquired? (Acquisition), and
3. How is such knowledge used? (Performance/Language Processing)

Although many linguists have the ability to speak in many languages, a linguist is not someone who speaks many languages. Those who are gifted with that kind of ability are **polyglots**. Having the ability to speak many languages is not required to become a linguist. Those who investigate human language in all of its facets, its use, its structure, its history, its place in society are **linguists**.

The field of linguistics includes a large number of subfields which is necessary to observe phenomena as complex as human language (Brown et.al, 2014). The following are the fields where linguistics is traditionally divided.

1. **Phonology**, it is the study of how sounds are organized/systemized.
2. **Phonetics**, it deals with the sounds of language.
3. **Morphology**, it deals with the study of word formation.
4. **Syntax**, it is the study of sentence structure.

5. **Semantics**, it deals with the meaning of words, sentences and texts.
6. **Pragmatics**, it is the study of how language is used in context.

Linguistics also tries to view language from other discipline's perspective. The effort resulted in the emergence of some more subfields within linguistics, some of them are:

1. **Sociolinguistics**, with roots in both sociology and linguistics, is the study of how language is used in real life environment (society/context).
2. **Psycholinguistics**, rooted from psychology and linguistics, deals with the relationship between linguistics behaviors and psychological processes, especially in the process of language acquisition.
3. **Anthropological linguistics/Ethnolinguistics**, with roots from anthropology and linguistics, focuses on how language is used in order to understand culture.
4. **Historical Linguistics**, a combination of history and linguistics, is about the study of language history and development.
5. **Neurolinguistics**, this subfield concerns on how language is processed in human's brain.
6. **Language Pedagogy**, it is related on how language is taught. The most-known field of this subfield is ESL/EFL/ TESOL.
7. **Computational Linguistics**, this subfield is related to how computer science is used to analyze and synthesize language and speech.
8. **Forensic Linguistics**, it is about how language science is applied in the context of law.

Through the brief explanation for each subfield, we can conclude that linguistics works in a very wide area. In fact,

there are still other subfields which are not mentioned in the explanation above (i.e. mathematical linguistics). To better enhance your understanding over those subfields, we will further discuss some of linguistics subfields above in the coming chapters.

1.3 The History of Linguistics

The interest in the nature of human language have emerged along with the evolution of human species throughout the history of time. Many culture in the world has left records that reveal either philosophical or practical concerns for this unique human ability. Along time, different historical periods reveal different concerns and different goals although both interests have existed in a strong bond of one word, language.

An Egyptian papyrus, dated around 1700 B.C. reveals information about medical descriptions of language disorders following brain injury. Although it is clinically grounded, this is an evidence that the Egyptian culture had put their concern on language. On the other hand, the philosophers of ancient Greece argued and debated questions dealing with the origin and the nature of language. **Plato**, writing between 427 and 348 B.C., devoted his *Cratylus Dialogue* to linguistic issues of his day and **Aristotle** was concerned with language from both rhetorical and philosophical points of view. Plato views language as the manifestation of human mind, he is also the first person to ever discriminate between *Onoma* (Nouns) and *Rhema* (Verbs). Additionally, Aristotle modifies Plato's theory by categorizing words into three categories: *Onoma* (Nouns), *Rhema* (Verbs), and *Syndesmoi* (Prepositions and conjunctions). He also categorizes words for sex into three: *Masculine* (male), *Feminine* (female), and *Neutrum* (neutral). The Greeks and the Romans also wrote grammars, and

discussed the sounds of language and the structures of words and sentences. This interest continued through the medieval period and the renaissance in an unbroken thread to the present period.

Interest in language was not only concentrated in Europe but also in other parts of the world. In India, the Sanskrit language was the subject of detailed analysis as early as the 12th century B.C. Panini's Sanskrit grammar dated at around 500 B.C. is regarded as one of the greatest achievements in linguistics. Additionally, Arabic and Chinese scholars have also contributed to the understanding of human language.




The Primary efforts in the field of linguistics in the 19th century were addressed to comparative and historical studies (Historical Linguistics). Ferdinand **de Saussure** (1857–1913), a Swiss linguist in around that time, turned his interest to the structural principles of language (Structuralism) rather than to language history and development. Later in the 20th century, he became the major influence in the field of linguistics with his structuralism approach.

In Europe and America, linguists moved their interest to the descriptive synchronic studies of languages and to the empirical methods on their analysis. Experts from different disciplines and with different interests changed their attention to some aspects of language and language use. American linguists in the first half of the century including Edward **Sapir** (1884–1939), the anthropologist, interested in the languages of the Americas, language and culture, and language in society.

In addition, Leonard **Bloomfield** (1887–1949), a historical and comparative linguist as well as a major descriptive linguist regarded as the most influential linguist in this period. Either Sapir or Bloomfield were also concerned with the development of a general theory of language. Sapir was a 'mentalist', he believed that any practical linguistic theory must be related to the mental representation of linguistic knowledge. Bloomfield in his later years was a follower of behaviorism, which was the mainstream of psychological thought at the time, a view that excluded any attention for mental representation of language and, thus, for the mind itself.

A European, Roman **Jakobson** (1896–1982), came to America in 1941 and gave substantial contribution to new developments in the linguistic field. He collaborated with Morris Halle and Gunnar Fant in which resulted to a theory of Distinctive Features in phonology. Halle has remained one of the leading phonologists of the last decades. In England, phoneticians like Daniel Jones (1881–1967) and Henry Sweet (1845–1912) have had a lasting influence on the study of the sound systems of language.



With the publication of *Syntactic Structures* in 1957, Noam **Chomsky** steered in the era of generative grammar, a theory which has been referred to as a scientific revolution (Fromkin, 2000). This theory of grammar has developed in depth and breadth. It is concerned with the biological basis for the acquisition, representation and use of human language and the universal principles which constrain the class of

all languages. It seeks to construct a scientific theory that is explicit and explanatory. His next publications after the publication of *Syntactic Structures* in 1957 and *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* in 1965 are based to a great extent on the developments in linguistic theory. In the following years, Chomsky has continued to develop his theory in such area as *Remarks on Nominalization* (1970), *Conditions on Transformations* (1973), *Lectures on Government and Binding* (1981), *Barriers* (1986), *Principles and Parameters in Syntactic Theory* (1981), and *The Minimalist Program* (1995). The development of all the theories mentioned before can be grouped into three broad categories which correspond roughly to historical time period.

Figure 1.2 Eight Design Features of Languages

Theoretical Orientation	Historical period
0) Non-theoretical studies	Before the 19 th century
1) Historical linguistics	19 th century
2) Structuralism	First half of 20 th century
3) Generative grammar	Second half of 20 th century


1.4 Prescriptivism VS Descriptivism

Generally, we can look at language from two points of view:

1. Prescriptivism consists of stating what is considered right and wrong in language. Prescriptivism passes judgements. For example, the view that splitting infinitives is wrong. This means that “to boldly come to.....” is a bad sentence because it separates the infinitive to come.
2. Contrastively, descriptivism, consists of describing the facts of language use in the real life, as in, some people do split infinitives, and some don't do it. Which kind of people split infinitives? When do they do that? What can

be used to split an infinitive?

A common misunderstanding is that descriptivists have no rules and that they have a permissive “anything is good” attitude. Descriptive linguistics is dedicated to describing the rules of the language, and language itself is essentially rule governed (that is, made of rules). Prescriptivists and descriptivists disagree in some respects. Descriptivists seek to figure out the rules that govern the languages spoken by the people of a specific language (i.e., English, Arabic, Italian, Swahili, and all others). Prescriptivists, on the other hand, tries to impose arbitrary rules that come from outside the language and seek to preserve a stage of the language that has been left behind by the language evolution. For example, the prescription of the avoidance of the splitting an infinitive was based on the fact that Latin avoided doing so, when in the past Latin was thought of as a “better” language than English. There are also times when prescriptivists are merely holding onto a past state of the language. For instance, the difference between the use of who and whom is now lost on most English speakers. There is nothing that we can do to restore this distinction, especially in speaking context.



What prescriptivists advises the speakers of a language to do or not to do is often not supported by linguistic data. For example, a common

claim of prescriptivists is that “double negative” (I don’t eat no meat) should be banned. In fact, English has always had the double negative in its history. Shakespeare, one of the

most prominent artist in past, uses it in *Romeo and Juliet*, III, i (Mercutio: I will not budge for no man's pleasure). Following certain grammatical rules is actually a social "**shibboleth**."

A shibboleth informs us about the group/community to which individuals belong. Language use helps in gathering the information about someone. When you do or say something in a particular way, you belong to a specific group/community. Following or not following certain linguistic forms may be used to identify a social class or ethnic group. African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) eliminates the copula in certain syntactic constructions, roughly whenever Informal English allows contractions (In *It's*, 's is the contracted form of is, the third-person singular form of the copula). So, *they are home* would be *they home* in AAVE. This act of elimination of the copula and other features of AAVE may be regarded as unprofessional or as ignorant, while in fact, those are signs of a speaker using a different dialect. Because of some historical reasons (Especially, the history of discrimination against African Americans), the AAVE dialect is regarded as less prestigious than other dialects; therefore, speakers will associate negative impressions, such as those noted, with it. In other words, a dialect marks a speaker socially. It can inform us about the speaker's community. This is the reason of why a specific dialect (or some features of a dialect) may be used as a social shibboleth.

1.5 Language As A System of Signs

In the perspective of linguists, human language is a system of signs, which can be defined as things that stand for or represent something else. In human language, signs always have an **exponent**, a **meaning** and some **referents**. An exponent is a physical representation of a sign, it is something

which can be perceived (heard, seen, touched, etc.) by the receiver of the message; e.g. a facial expression, the sounding of a horn, a gesture, a road sign, a picture, a word, etc. The individual actions, things, qualities and states in the world to which a sign refers are the referents (= denotata) of the sign, and these together constitute the reference (= extension) of the sign. In addition to that, a sign also carries meaning with it. The meaning of a sign is the concept which is evoked in its usage and which can then be identified with a set of semantic features; this set can be called the sign's intension. For instance, the English word *man* evokes a concept that includes the features 'adult, male, human'. Linguistic signs involve sequences of sounds which is the representation of concrete objects and events and so does abstractions. Signs may be related to the things they represent in some ways. Signs can be grouped into three basic kinds: **symbolic**, **iconic** and **symptomatic**.



When an arbitrary relationship is held between an exponent of a sign with its referents, the sign is considered as a symbol. For instance, the traffic lights' colors are **symbolic**. There is an arbitrary convention that the red light means 'stop' and the green light means 'go'. In principle, the meaning of red light as stop and the green light as go

could be made the other way around. Most of the words in human languages are symbolic signs: their physical form (pronunciation) and their referents are arbitrarily connected, consider e.g. English *Floor*, Indonesian *Lantai*, German *Boden*, Arabic 'arbak, Somali *dabaqa*, etc., which all the words refer

to the same kind of thing but all sound differently.



However, whenever we find an exponent and the referents of a sign which have a natural resemblance, we can conclude that the sign is an icon. For instance, the silhouette of a man or a woman on a public restroom door is an **iconic** sign. A small number of the words in languages like onomatopoeic words, e.g. English bowwow, moo, meow, oink, cuckoo, etc., are signs that are partly iconic. But even those words are partly symbolic because their counterparts in other languages are never quite the same.



Finally, whenever we find that the exponent of a sign is linked to its source in such a way that it results a spontaneous reflection of the state of the source, the sign is called as a **symptom** (= indicium). The state of blushing on our face is the symptom of embarrassment, a trembling voice which comes out of our mouth is the symptom of excitement or fear, smoke which comes out of a burning wood is the symptom of fire, etc. Symptoms do not need interpretation in a language, they are interpreted simply by being there as a direct association between two states of affairs. They are not chosen and sent deliberately but follow automatically from certain states of affairs. (We, human beings, are deliberately capable of producing some symptoms. Usually, this kind of act happens in playacting or deceiving, e.g. when somebody deliberately

assumes a drunken way of walking, even when he/she is not drunk at all).

In the world languages, there is only a small number of signs in languages which are iconic. Onomatopoeic words, which resemble the natural sounds they represent, are a likely candidate. However, while “bowwow” might represent the sound of a dog in English, for example, other languages represent the sound quite differently (for example, “guk guk” in Indonesian or “amh-amh” in Irish). Thus, even such words are highly conventionalized. Certain aspects of word order are indeed iconic. In the following sentences, we would automatically assume that the words, phrases, or clauses represents the causal and temporal order in which the events took place:

Andi went to Surabaya, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta.

Jasmine became ill and left the party.

He ate hamburger, read the magazine, and watched a football show on TV.

Let’s take a look at the second sentence, we will naturally assume that Jasmine became ill before she left the party and/ or she left the party because she became ill. Note the very different interpretation we give to *Jasmine left the party and became ill*. Or in the sentence *If you study hard before the exam, you will get a good score*, we know that the condition *study hard* precedes the consequence of *get a good score*, both in the sentence and in actual life. Iteration can also sometimes be iconic, as in *The price of an apartment in the downtown became more and more expensive*, where the repetition of more has an intensifying effect. A small number of language aspects are indexical, such as the demonstrative pronouns *this* or *that*, which point to the distance of things

they represent as close to or far away from the speaker, or adverbs such as *now* and *then*, which represents the moment of speaking or after/before the moment of speaking, respectively.



Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, stated that the relationship between the linguistic sign and what it signifies is conventional or arbitrary. What he meant by an arbitrary connection is that the sequence of sounds constituting a word have no natural, logical, necessary, or inevitable connection to the thing in the real world which it names. The speakers

of the language must agree that it names that thing. Since there is no strong connection between the linguistic sign and its referents, speakers must simply learn it. Speakers of English, for instance, have come to a social agreement that the word *strawberry* stands for a particular fruit; there is no resemblance between the sound of the word and the taste or the appearance of the fruit. However, like other social agreements, such as those concerning with manners or dress, linguistic agreements can be changed: English speakers could, for example, agree to call a strawberry a *sourfruit*. Nowadays, English speakers have agreed to substitute quite a number of words which were felt to have acquired derogatory or negative connotations, such as the replacement of *retarded* by *intellectual disability*, *Midget/dwarf* by *little person* or the replacement of *handicapped* by *disabled*.


Language consists of signs occurring in a system and not in a random selection. This system consists of smaller units

which is related to each other and designed for a particular functions. The smaller units are organized on certain principles, or rules. For those reasons, language is said to be rule-governed. Language rules, or its underlying system, are inferable from the observable patterns of the language. The underlying system constitutes what is called **grammatical competence**. The grammatical competence itself is a part of native speakers' implicit knowledge. It is their *internalized grammar*. Although the grammatical competence of native speakers is complete and perfect, the actual use of that competence may not be perfect.

The rules of language act as a kind of limitations on what is possible in a language. For instance, in the area of syntax, the rules of English permit *She likes doughnuts* or *Doughnuts she likes*, but not **Likes doughnuts she* (ungrammatical, not permitted by the rules of English language). The same goes to word formation, *overnight* is a possible verb expressing a length of time (as in *The protesters overnighted in front of the People's Consultative Assembly's building*), but *midnight*, because it expresses a specific point in time, is not a possible verb (as in **The travelers midnighted in the front of a store*). English phonological rules would allow the word *droce* (though it does not exist), but would not generate the word **dlacbr*. Furthermore, we know by the morphological rules of the language that if *droce* were a verb, the past tense would be *droced*, pronounced with a final "t" sound (not the "d" or "ed" sound that is found in other past tense forms), and if *droce* were a noun, the plural would be *droces*, pronounced with a final "ez" sound (not the "s" or "z" sound that is found in other plural forms).

1.6 Communicative Competence

Chomsky (1965) underlined the difference between linguistic competence, the speaker - hearer's knowledge of his language and the actual use of language in concrete situations. He pointed out that linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker - listener, in a completely homogeneous speech - community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as distractions , memory limitations,




The Far Side by Gary Larson

shifts of attention and interests, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. Chomsky describes **competence** as an idealized capacity that is located as a psychological or mental property and **performance** as the production of actual utterances. In short, competence is about “knowing” the language and performance is “doing” something with the language. Underlining the distinction between competence and performance is important primarily because it allows those studying a language to differentiate between a speech error and an error caused by not knowing something about the language. To understand this distinction, it is helpful to think about a time when you have made a kind of error in your speech. For example, let’s say you are a native speaker of English and utter the following sentence:

They runned on the sidewalk 50 minutes ago.

Is this error due to lack in competence or performance? It is most likely that, as a native speaker of English, a person is aware how to change irregular verbs from present to past form but his performance has let him down at the time the sentence is spoken. Linguists use the difference between competence and performance to demonstrate the intuitive difference between accidentally saying *runned* and the fact that a child or a non-proficient speaker of English may not know that the past tense of *run* is *ran* and say *runned* consistently.

Dell Hymes (1972) was the first to point out that Chomsky’s notion of competence dealing with the ideal speaker-listener in a homogeneous speech community provides no place for competency for language use. More specifically, the theory fails to address the whole socio-cultural



dimension. As a linguist and anthropologist, Hymes was concerned with linguistic theory and with the socio-cultural aspect of language. Indeed, says Hymes, what one is inevitably concerned with is “performance”, the actual use of language in a concrete situation; its use moreover by speaker-listeners who are far from being “ideal” and whose language society cannot be characterized as that of any “homogeneous speech community”.

Hymes underlined that Chomsky’s narrow concept of competence as some kind of “Garden of Eden” perspective which ignores questions of use by relegating them to the area of performance. This limitation of Chomsky’s linguistic competence allows Hymes to come out with the term “communicative competence”. As it was described by Hymes (1971), communicative competence is a wide term which includes not only linguistic knowledge but also knowledge of a set of socio-linguistic codes and rules for using them.

Hymes claims that communicative competence is “the most general term for the speaking and hearing capabilities of a person competence is understood to be dependent on two things: (tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use”. He later suggested that the actual theory of communicative competence involves four types of knowledge and abilities.

1. Whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible.
2. Whether (and to what degree) something is feasible in virtue of the means of implementation available.

3. Whether (and to what degree) something is appropriate (adequate, happy, successful) in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated.
4. Whether (and to what degree) something is in fact done, actually performed, and what its doing entails. (Hymes, 1972)

Since Hymes's theory of communicative competence, some researchers have written about communicative competence, but have used a variety of definitions. Brown (1976) stated that, unlike linguistic competence, communicative competence involves awareness of the transactions that occur between people. The competence in his perspective is related to the actual performance of the language in social situations (Wieman and Backlund, 1980). A wider definition of communicative competence was suggested by Backlund (1977), one that is not limited only to language usage. He claims that communicative competence is the ability of a speaker to select among available communicative behavior in order that he/she may successfully fulfill his/her own interpersonal goals during an encounter while maintaining the face and line of the other speaker within the constraints of the situations.

Now, let us discuss more on the concept of communicative competence itself which, indeed, needs further clarification. For Hymes (1972) and Campbell and Wales (1970) communicative competence is to include not only grammatical competence (or explicit and implicit knowledge of the rules of grammar in a language) but also contextual and sociolinguistic competence (knowledge of the rules of language use). Additionally, they recognize the distinction between communicative competence and communicative performance, where this last term refers to the actual use of

communicative competence.

Fischer (1984) argues that, in the field of language learning and teaching, “linguistic competence may be thought of as the learner’s knowledge of the structures and vocabulary of the language and his ability to produce and comprehend well-formed sentences in the language”. In this perspective, the students’ participation in the classroom is described as a rule governed behavior in which Fischer’s attention is focused on the application of rules to derive correct grammatical forms. As far as pragmatics is concerned, Oller (1970) claims that communicative competence has definite implications for language teaching. As one of the implications, Oller suggested that pattern drills should be designed in such a way that instead of manipulating purely abstract elements of a totally unrelated sentences illustrating a point of syntax, the student should be using language to respond to a paradigm of situations.

For Savignon (1972) foreign language communicative competence is considered as the ability to function dynamically in a truly communicative setting and adapting to all of the informational elements in the context, be they linguistic or non-verbal context. Thus, it can be inferred that although communicative competence implies an underlying knowledge and a potential to communicate well, its definition is usually associated with actual performance in a social situation. Nonetheless, opinions in the literature vary as to whether communicative competence should be distinguished from communicative performance and whether communicative competence should include grammatical competence as one of its components.

Regarding to this last point, Widdowson (1971), Paulston (1974), and Palmer (1978), and among others consider that

communicative competence should be differentiated from that of linguistic competence. To their beliefs, communicative competence is used to refer exclusively to knowledge or capacity relating to the rules of language use and the term linguistic competence used only to refer to the rules of grammar.

Widdowson (1971) proposes the differentiation between language usage, the knowledge of linguistic rules and use, and the ability to use his knowledge of linguistic rules for effective communication. He underlines that in normal circumstances, linguistic performance involves the simultaneous manifestation of the language system as its usage and realization is applied. We can separate one from the other if we want by concentrating our attention on one rather than the other. For Munby (1978), the view that communicative competence includes grammatical competence is to be preferred to the view that it does not put grammatical competence as its part, because following the former view eliminates two misleading conclusions:

1. That grammatical competence and communicative competence should be taught separately, or that the former should be taught first, and
2. That grammatical competence is not an essential component of communicative competence.

Responding on this issue, Canale and Swain (1980) point out that Munby's first reason is implausible because even if one follows the position that communicative competence should include grammatical competence, it is still viable to sustain that the teaching of grammatical competence could be distinguished from or preceded the teaching of sociolinguistic competence. For Munby's second reason, Canale and Swain argue that it is both a convincing and

important reason. Furthermore, they propose the example of a Canadian native English speaker who might have an adequate level of sociolinguistic competence in Canadian because he developed such a competence in Canadian English. With that competence in hand, it does not mean that person could communicate effectively with a monolingual speaker of Canadian French without a minimal level of grammatical competence in French.


Now let us study the second view of communicative competence, the view which considers that communicative competence should be distinguished from communicative performance. Some researchers (Carroll 1961, Briere 1971, Canale and Swain 1980) indicate that communicative competence should be separated from communicative performance, that is the realization of these competencies and also their interaction in the actual production of utterances. Additionally, they underline that this distinction should be kept at least for second language teaching and testing purposes. They assert that the teaching methodology and assessment instruments must be designed in such a way to address not only communicative competence but also communicative performance, the actual demonstration of knowledge in real second language situations and for authentic communicative purposes. Savignon (1983) also support the notion that the distinction between communicative competence and communicative performance should be maintained. She states that although there is a theoretical difference between competence and performance, unlike competence, performance is observable and therefore provides the information to make inferences about a person's hidden competence. Furthermore, Rea (1985) claims that although the distinction between communicative

performance and communicative competence is justifiable at the theoretical level, he believes that it is confusing and misleading at the practical context. In language testing, for example, he criticizes the commonly held distinction between “competence oriented tests” and “performance” tests and suggests the use of only one term to represent two mentioned tests and that is “performance” test only.

In a nutshell, we could conclude that even though for methodological reasons the literature on language teaching and language testing gives this impression that linguistic competence and communicative competence are theoretically a distinct construct with only few features are in common, our perspective on this matter is that linguistic competence and communicative competence are complementary one to another and neither of the two competence can occur without the other. It is in line to Gunterman and Phillips (1980) opinion that a person cannot communicate without his grammar and at the exact same time the communicative use of language appears to be essential to the acquisition of linguistic features. Thus, linguistic competence and communicative competence are not separate concepts with nothing in common, they are both part of the language. In addition to that, Davies (1978) states that linguistic competence and communicative competence constitute different points along a single language learning continuum. Canale and Swain (1979) would address this combined, overall proficiency as only one communicative competence. nevertheless, the distinction has to be sustained only for second or foreign language teaching testing purposes, since foreign language instructional materials, methods and tests are often designed to generate one rather than the other. In this issue, Palmer (1979) states that second language learners

can experience either classified or integrated control of the two language components. In the first case (classified situation), the foreign language learner will get a good control of the formal aspect of the language (vocabulary, phonology and grammar) but with the consequence of unable to get his meaning across easily. In the second case (integrated situation), a foreign language learner will have the chance to communicate or to get his message across with little access to control his/her grammar. Thus, linguistic and communicative competence must be integrated to produce a complete language proficiency. The integration is, in my opinion, the ultimate goal of a foreign language class.

Figure 1.3 The relationship among the four components of overall language proficiency




The figure above describes the relationship among the four components of language proficiency: linguistic competence, communicative competence, linguistic performance, communicative performance. The upper part of the figure indicates that both linguistic and communicative competence are elements of overall language proficiency as it is referred to in the text as integration. In addition, the bottom

part of the figure shows that only performance (linguistic and communicative performance) is observable and can be directly measured. Therefore, it is through performance that we may infer levels of competence.

1.7 The Origins of Language

Based on Charles Darwin's perspective of the origins of language (1871), it is stated that prehistoric humans had



already invented musical ability prior to language, the ability was then used to charm each other. It may not suit the general image that most of us have of our early ancestors as rather vicious characters wearing animal skins and not very attractive, but we have to agree at some point that it is an interesting thought on how language may have developed. Still, it remains only as

a speculation. Briefly speaking, we don't know how language is originated actually. In some respects, we do understand that the ability to produce sound and simple vocal patterning seems to be in an ancient part of our brain which we share with other living beings, including birds, frogs, fish and other mammals. Yet, that isn't human language. Johanna Nichols (1998), a linguist at the University of California, Berkeley, proposed a view that vocal languages must have begun expanding in human species at least 100,000 years ago. Her study is based on statistical methods to estimate the time required to reach the contemporary spread and diversity in modern languages. Furthermore, a study by Atkinson (2011)

suggests that successive population bottlenecks occurred as our African ancestors migrated to other areas, leading to a decrease in genetic and phenotypic diversity. He also argues that these bottlenecks also affected culture and language. The arguments arrives to a hypothesis that the further away a particular language is from Africa, the fewer phonemes it contains. Evidently, Atkinson claims that the current languages in Afrika tend to have a relatively large numbers of phonemes, while languages from areas in Oceania, the last place to which humans migrated, have relatively few. Following Atkinson's work, a succeeding study has investigated the level at which phonemes develop naturally, contrasting this level to some of Africa's oldest languages. The outcomes recommend that language first evolved at around 350,000–150,000 years ago. It is around that time when modern Homo sapiens evolved.

However, approximations of this kind are not universally accepted, but jointly considering genetic, archaeological, paleontological and much other evidence indicates that language probably emerged somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa during the Middle Stone Age, roughly contemporaneous with the speciation of Homo sapiens. Yule (2010) suspects that some type of spoken language must have developed between 100,000 and 50,000 years ago, long before written language emerged (about 5,000 years ago). Yet, among the clues of earlier periods of life on earth, we never find any direct evidence or artifacts relating to the speech of our distant ancestors that might inform us on how language was in the early stages. Probably because of this absence of direct physical evidence, there has been no shortage of speculation about the origins of human speech.

1.7.1 The Divine Source

In the bible, as it is described in the book of Genesis, God created Adam and “whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof”. Alternately, changing our perspective on a Hindu tradition, language is originated from Sarasvati, wife of Brahma, creator of the universe. In many religions, there seems to be a divine source who provides humans with language. Attempting to rediscover this original divine language, a few experiments have been held, with rather contrasting outcomes. The basic hypothesis used in those experiments is that if human babies were set to a condition that they grow up without hearing any language around them, then they would naturally begin using the original God-given language.

Herodotus, a Greek writer, reported the story of an Egyptian pharaoh named Psammetichus (or Psamtik) who held an experiment with two newborn babies more than 2,500 years ago. Later after two years of segregation excluding the presence of goats and a mute shepherd, the two children were described to have impulsively uttered, not an Egyptian word, but it was a word that was later identified as the Phrygian word of *bekos*, meaning “bread.” The pharaoh deduced that Phrygian, which is an older language spoken in part of what is modern Turkey, must be the original language. Looking at the arguments, the conclusion above seems to be very unlikely. Some commentators have tried to explain the situation by stating that the children may not have picked up the word from any human source, it is of high probability that they must have heard what the goats were saying. (First remove the -kos ending, which was added in the Greek version of the story, then pronounce be- as you would the English word bed without -d at the end. Can you hear a goat?)

It is at around 15000 that King James the Fourth of Scotland implemented a related experiment where children are conditioned to be isolated and not having any contact with the outside world. The children were said to have spontaneously started speaking Hebrew, confirming the king's belief that Hebrew had indeed been the language of the Garden of Eden. However, it is inauspicious that all other cases of children who have been discovered living in relegation, without having any access to human speech, tend not to support the results of these types of divine-source experiments. Children at young age living without any communication with other humans and having no access to human language in their early years grow up with no language at all. Evidently, the case of Victor, the wild boy of Aveyron in France, discovered near the end of the eighteenth century, and also of Genie, an American child whose special life circumstances came to light in the 1970s seems to support that there is no spontaneous language of any divine source.

1.7.2 The Natural Sound Source




A relatively different perspective of the origin of language is based on the concept of natural sounds. Through some experiments, it is known that the human auditory system is already functioning before birth (at around seven months).

That initial processing capacity develops into an ability to recognize sounds in the environment, giving humans the

ability to make a connection between a sound and the thing producing that sound. It gives the ground for a hypothesis that primitive words derive from imitations of the natural sounds that prehistoric men and women heard around them. Among other nicknames that he invented to talk about the origins of speech, Jespersen (1922) called this idea the “bow-wow” theory

1. The “bow-wow” theory



Based on this theory, there is a scenario that when different objects flew by, making a Caw-Caw or Coo-Coo sound, human in the prehistoric period tried to imitate the sounds and, thus, used them

to refer to those objects even when they weren't present. Indeed, that all modern languages have some words in them with pronunciations that seem to imitate naturally occurring sounds could be made as the evidence to support this theory. In English, in addition to cuckoo, we have splash, bang, boom, rattle, buzz, hiss, screech, and of course bow-wow. Words that sound similar to the noises they describe are examples of **onomatopoeia**.

While it is true that a number of words in any language are onomatopoeic, it is difficult to understand how most of the soundless things (e.g. “big chair”) as well as abstract concepts (e.g. “faith”) could have been referred to in a language that simply mimicking or imitating natural sounds. In addition, it is also arguable that a language is only a set of words used as “names” for things. We have

a big number of words that does not even represent thing like the word “let”, “odd”, “funny”, etc.

2. The “pooh-pooh” theory



Jespersen also suggested other theory named the “pooh-pooh” theory. This theory proposes that speech are developed from the reflexive sounds people make in emotional circumstances. To say at the very least, it is the original sounds of language which may

have come from natural cries of emotion such as anger, pain and joy. By the definition, we can assume that the word “Ouch!” came to have its painful connotations. However, the word “Ouch!” and other sounds such as “Ah!”, “Ooh!”, “Phew!”, “Wow!” or “Yuck!” are normally produced with sudden intakes of breath, which is actually the opposite of ordinary talk. Humans normally produce spoken language as they breathe out, so they utter words while they exhale, not inhale. So to speak, the expressive sounds people say in emotional reactions contain sounds that are not used in speech production and, thus, would seem to be rather unlikely candidates as source sounds for language.

1.7.3 The Natural Sound Source

Other suggestion involving natural sounds was named the “yo-he-ho” theory. The suggestion is that the sounds of a

person involved in physical effort could be the source of our language, especially when that physical effort involved several people and the interaction had to be coordinated. Therefore, it is assumed that a group of prehistoric humans might develop a set of grunts, hums, groans and curses that were used when they were carrying and lifting large bits of trees or lifeless prehistoric animals.



The interesting aspect of this proposal is that it places the development of human language in a social context. Prehistoric people must have lived in groups, it is especially because larger group

offered better protection from any attack. Being in groups are socially needed in the prehistoric period and, to maintain those kind of organizations, some ways of communication is required, even if it is just grunts and hums. Thus, human sounds, in whatever ways they were produced, definitely have had some principled use within the life and social interaction of prehistoric human groups. This is an important notion that may connect to the uses of humanly produced sounds. Nevertheless, it does not answer our question regarding the origins of the language. Primates like apes, gorillas, and others live in social groups and use grunts and social calls, but to this day they do not seem to have developed the capacity to utter meaningful words.

1.7.4 The Physical Adaptation Source

Rather than looking at types of sounds as the source of human speech, we can turn our perspective at the types of

physical features humans possess, particularly on those that are distinct from other living beings, which may have been able to support our speech production. We can begin with the consideration that, at the prehistoric stage, early humans made a very significant transition to an upright posture, with bi-pedal (on two feet) movement, and a revised role for the front limbs. Some consequences of this type of change can be seen in the physical distinction between the skull of a gorilla and that of a Neanderthal man from around 60,000 years ago. The recreated vocal tract of a Neanderthal indicates that some consonant-like sound productions would have been possible to do. It is not until about 35,000 years ago that the features in reconstructions of fossilized skeletal structures begin to look similar to those of modern humans. Based on study of evolutionary development, there are certain physical development, could be said as partial adaptations, which seem to be supportive for speech. They are efficient versions of features found in other primates. Only by themselves, those features wouldn't guarantee speech. However, they could be good indicators that a creature with such features probably has the ability for speech.

1. Teeth and lips



We all know that human teeth are upright, not slanting outwards like those of gorillas, apes and other primates. Additionally, human teeth are roughly

even in height. Those characteristics are not very useful for tearing or ripping food and seem to be good for chewing

and grinding. The characteristics are also very supportive in making sounds like f or v. Furthermore, Human lips have much more intricate muscle interlacing than is found in other primates and their resulting flexibility certainly helps in making sounds like p, b and m. In fact, the b and m sounds are the most widely attested in the vocalizations made by human infants during their first year, no matter which language their parents are using.

2. Mouth and tongue

Human's mouth is fairly small compared to apes, orang utans, or other primates and can be opened and closed quickly. Our mouth is also part of an extended vocal tract that has much more of an L-shape than the reasonably straight line from front to back in other mammals. Human's tongue is shorter, thicker and more muscular that can be used to shape a wide variety of sounds inside the oral cavity. Contrastively, other large primates have a fairly thin and flat tongue. Additionally, not like other primates, humans can close off the airway through the nose to create more air pressure in the mouth. The whole effect of these small differences taken together is a face with more intricate muscle interlacing in the lips and mouth, capable of a wider range of shapes and a more rapid and powerful delivery of sounds produced through these different shapes.

3. Larynx and pharynx

The human larynx (also known as "voice box"), containing the vocal folds or vocal cords, differs significantly in position from the larynx of monkeys, apes, or other primates. In the issue of human physical development, the assumption is that an upright posture moved the head more directly above the spinal column and the larynx dropped to a lower

position. The condition created a longer cavity called the pharynx which functions as a resonator for increased range and clarity of the sounds produced via the larynx and the vocal tract. Contrastively, other primates have almost no pharynx. One unfortunate consequence of this development is that the lower position of the human larynx makes it more likely that human can choke on pieces of food. Apes and monkeys may not be able to use their larynx to produce speech sounds, but they do not have to experience the problem of getting food stuck in their windpipe. In evolutionary terms, there must have been a big advantage in getting this extra vocal power (i.e. a larger range of sounds) to exceed the potential drawback from an increased danger of choking to death.

1.7.5 The Tool-making Source

In the physical adaptation theory, the function of producing speech sounds must have been covered by the existing anatomical features (lips, teeth, or tongue) previously used for other functions like chewing, sucking or tearing. A corresponding development is believed to also happen to human hands and that manual gestures may have been a predecessor of language. At around two million years ago, there is an indication that humans had developed skills with their right hands and capable of making stone tools. Wood tools and composite tools eventually followed. Tool-making, or the outcome of manipulating objects and changing them using both hands, is evidence of a brain at work.

Human brain is not only large compares to human body size, but also lateralized. It has specific functions in each of the two hemispheres. The two functions which control the motoric movements involved in complex vocalization

(speaking) and object manipulation (making or using tools) are relatively close to each other in the left hemisphere of the brain. To be exact, the area of the motor cortex which controls the muscles of the arms and hands is next to the articulatory muscles of the tongue, jaw, and face. It is possible that there was an evolutionary relation between human's language using and tool-using abilities and that both were involved in the development of the brain to produce speech. Many other speculative suggestions or ideas concerning the origins of speech seem to be grounded on a picture of humans producing single noises to indicate objects in their environment. That activity may indeed have been a crucial stage in the development of language, but what it lacks is any structural organization. In all languages, including sign language, the organizing and combining of sounds or signs in specific arrangements is required. It is likely that we have developed a part of our brain that specializes in making these kind of arrangements.

Thinking about the most basic process involved in primitive tool-making, it is not sufficient to be able to grasp one rock (make one sound); the human must also bring another rock (other sounds) into proper contact with the first in order to develop a tool. Looking back to language structure, human may have first invented a naming ability by producing a specific and consistent sound (e.g. sheep) for a specific thing. The pivotal next step was to bring another specific noise (e.g. big) into combination with the first to build a complex message (sheep big). Several thousand years of development later, humans have honed this message-building capacity to a point where, on Saturdays, playing outdoor, they can have a picnic, see a sheep near them and say *that sheep is pretty big*. Other primates like monkeys, apes, or orang utans do not have this ability.

1.7.6 The Genetic Source

It is normal to assume that the human baby in its first few years is a living example of some of these physical changes. When first born, baby's brain is only a quarter of its body weight and the larynx is much higher in the throat, allowing babies, like chimpanzees, to breathe and drink at the same time. Shortly after some months, the brain develops, the larynx descends, the child has an upright posture and starts talking and walking. The fact that the process is naturally happened to the set of developments and the complexity of the young child's language have led some scholars to look for something more powerful than small physical adaptations of the species over time as the source of language. Still, children who are born deaf and do not have the ability to utter speech become fluent sign language users, in condition that they have supportive environment, very early in life. It leads to the idea that human offspring are born with a special capacity for language. It is innate, no other living beings seems to have it, and it isn't tied to a specific kind of language. Is it possible that this language capacity is genetically hard-wired in the newborn human?

Considering this innateness hypothesis as a solution to the puzzle of the origins of language, it would seem to point to something in human genetics, possibly a crucial mutation as the source. The mutation itself would not have been a gradual change, but something that happened rather quickly. We are not sure when this proposed genetic change might have taken place or how it might relate to the physical adaptations described earlier. However, as we consider this hypothesis, we realize that our speculations about the origins of language moving away from fossil evidence or the physical source of basic human sounds toward analogies with how computers

work (e.g. being pre-programmed or hard-wired) and concepts taken from the study of genetics. The search for the origins of language then turns into a search for the special “language gene” that only humans possess. In the beginning of the 21st century, Lai et.al. (2001) investigated the speech disorder phenomena of a family in the United Kingdom. The major finding is that the speech disorder is resulted from the mutation of a gene called FOXP2 gene. Forkhead box protein P2 (FOXP2) is a protein that in humans is encoded by the FOXP2 gene. This gene is later known as an essential gene for proper development of speech and language. FOXP2 is popularly dubbed the “language gene”, but this is partially correct because there are other genes involved in language development. It directly regulates a number of other genes, including CNTNAP2, CTBP1, and SRPX2 (Spiteri et.al., 2007).

CHAPTER 2

The Study of Language

2.1 Traditional Grammar

Languages began to be studied a very long time ago, that is, at around the 5th century BC or earlier. Yet, it is not until the 19th century that we can speak about linguistics. In the 19th century, historical language study began to take place and meet the criteria of scientificity. In the beginning of the 20th century, the study of contemporary languages became scientific in today's sense of the word. Earlier language study can be called **Traditional Grammar**. In principle, this kind of language study dealt with the contemporary state of languages but it often mixed its synchronic statements with diachronic ones. Some aspects of traditional grammar below indicated that the study was not sufficiently scientific.

1. Traditional grammar was not explicit enough

It was often too vague in its statements and its definitions were often too broad. For instance, noun was seen as “the name of a person, place or thing”. On the other hand, there are lots of words that we intuitively feel to be nouns

even though they are not the names of persons, places or things, e.g. reflection.

2. Traditional grammar was not systematic enough
It ignored spoken language and was preoccupied with written language, especially with the written language of older literary works.
3. It was not objective enough
It was often prescriptive and puristic rather than descriptive, i.e. instead of recording what the language examined was like, traditional grammarians often tried to prescribe what it should be like.

In these attempts they relied on their subjective wishes and speculations and on historical, logical and aesthetic arguments, and on analogy with Latin. For example, they argued that the split infinitive, which is quite common in English, was incorrect: “You shouldn’t say to humbly apologize, you should say: to apologize humbly”. The idea that the split infinitive was wrong was based on Latin. It was believed that, since a Latin infinitive was only one word, its English equivalent should also be as near to one word as possible. Traditional grammarians thought that language change was harmful and they fought against it.

With all its weaknesses, however, Traditional Grammar accumulated a great number of facts about individual languages and elaborated linguistic terminology. Modern linguistics would not have been born if there had been no Traditional Grammar to prepare the way for it.

2.2 Comparative Philology

Comparative Philology was the dominant kind of language study in the 19 century. It was scientific in several respects.

However, it narrowed down the concept of language study to a study of the history and genetical relationships of languages and of the written records that were available.

This kind of linguistics emerged after the discovery that Sanskrit was related to Latin and Greek. The discovery was made in 1786, by a British government official working in India, Sir William Jones. Throughout the 19th century, language scholars tried to establish genetical relationships between languages. That was the time when the various language families and branches were discovered, for example the Germanic branch (of which English is a member) and a Proto-Indo-European parent language was reconstructed. In Comparative Philology the study of language was beginning to develop towards an autonomous, independent branch of study. Language began to be studied for its own sake. Besides, this kind of language study had an objective method: it was based on textual evidence, i.e. E-language facts, found in earlier written records of language, and it also tried to show language change in a systematic way, as a process determined by rules. (In the last quarter of the 19th century, a group of scholars in and around Leipzig, nicknamed the neogrammarians, claimed that language changes were not just accidental events or optional tendencies, but “laws”). Meanwhile, the study of the contemporary state of languages went on in the non-scientific (or not sufficiently scientific) framework of Traditional Grammar.

2.3 The Beginning of Modern Linguistics in Europe


Modern linguistics emerged almost simultaneously in Europe and the USA in the early decades of the 20th century. In Europe the study of language at the beginning of the 20

century was characterized by two features: the inheritance of a long period of Traditional Grammar, and the predominantly historical interest of 19th century Comparative Philology. Modern linguistics appeared as a kind of revolt against this background. The first great figure of modern linguistics in Europe, Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss scholar, was a comparative philologist himself (a professor of Sanskrit at the University of Geneva), but his ideas about language and language study went far beyond the limitations of Comparative Philology. He was the first to emphasize the difference between (a) language as an abstract system, residing in the collective consciousness of the community (which he called *la langue*) and (b) language as the realization of that system (which he called *la parole*). We know his revolutionary ideas from a posthumous book, *Cours de Linguistique Générale*, which was published by his students in 1916. He separated the synchronic and diachronic aspects of language study, and argued for the primacy of the former by saying that the synchronic aspect deals with language as a collection of simultaneous facts, existing as a state at a particular point of time, whereas the diachronic regards language as a succession of states, so it is the states that have to be described first.

According to Saussure, linguistic signs enter into two kinds of relationship: syntagmatic and paradigmatic. The syntagmatic relationship is a linear (horizontal, chain) relationship, which exists between the signs that follow one another in a complex unit. For example, the four words in *This coffee is strong* are in a syntagmatic relationship: they are placed one after the other along the syntagmatic axis, and each of the words has a particular environment or CONTEXT which consists of the other words on its left and right. The paradigmatic relationship is a vertical (choice) relationship, which exists between a


sign present in a particular environment and all the other signs that could replace it while still yielding a well-formed complex unit. For instance, coffee in the above sentence is in a paradigmatic relationship with tea, student, girl, wall, light, whisky, cigar, etc., see 1.

1.



Since Saussure's time the notion of these two relationships has been extended to phonemes as well, see (2).

2.



2.4 The Beginning of Modern Linguistics in America

Linguistic research in the USA also began in the early decades of the 20th century, but with a different motivation. Here it was found that the languages of the American Indian population (the Amerindian languages) were threatened with extinction and so the main aim was to describe these languages as quickly and accurately as possible. Modern American linguistics in the first half of the 20th century was usually called structural(ist) or descriptive linguistics.

The Amerindian languages did not make a traditional approach possible. They existed only in a spoken form, they had no earlier written records, they were very different from most of the languages studied until then, and the linguists

who wanted to describe them did not speak them, so no prescriptive and puristic statements could be made about them. Briefly speaking, these languages forced language scholars to adopt a non-traditional approach to language, based on objectivity, systematicness and explicitness.

American descriptivists tried to describe each language in its own terms and they emphasized (even exaggerated) the differences between languages. One of them, Martin Joos, said: “Languages differ from one another without limit and in unpredictable ways.” This is the essence of linguistic relativism. Linguistic relativism is the assumption that any natural language can be totally different from other natural languages. But some linguists went even further. Sapir and especially Whorf thought that languages not only differed from one another without limit but also that the language of a community determined the way in which that community saw the world. This latter view is called linguistic determinism.

The combination of linguistic relativism and linguistic determinism became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. According to the strong version of the hypothesis the individual is not free in his experience of the world, because the vocabulary and grammatical categories of his native language determine the ways in which he can interpret his experience. For instance, the American linguist Boas discovered that in Eskimo there are several different words for different kinds of snow, whereas in English there is only one generic term: snow. Other linguists collected similar facts from other languages. (For instance, the Navajo language has no separate words for blue and green but has two separate words for different shades of black; the Hopi language does not distinguish present, past and future tenses; in Kwakiutl the distinction between singular and plural number is not obligatory, etc.)

On the basis of such examples the conclusion was drawn that people belonging to different cultural-linguistic groups not only spoke differently but also thought differently: i.e. each cultural-linguistic community lived in the “prison” of its language. This conclusion, however, cannot be accepted.

It is true that different languages cut up reality in different ways, but this is because different communities find different things important in their life. The fact that the English have no separate words for different kinds of snow does not mean that they cannot see these differences, only that they are not significant to them. When these differences do become important, the English can paraphrase and say “falling snow”, “hard packed snow”, “powdery snow”, etc. The main counter-argument against the strong form of linguistic determinism is the possibility of translation. Translation is possible for most of the time and although we cannot always translate everything with the same ease, we are nevertheless usually able at least to paraphrase or explain what we mean in any language.

However, the weak form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, according to which language influences thought, seems to be correct. Certain things are less codable (i.e. less expressible) in some languages than in others. The codability of an aspect of reality in a particular language means having a word for it, or at least the possibility of a simple paraphrase. People tend to notice and remember the things that are codable in their language better than things that are not codable. But differences in codability between languages are of secondary importance: it is only the less basic, culture-specific concepts that may present codability problems. The essential things are equally codable because they are equally relevant to all cultures.

Linguist Leonard Bloomfield, and his followers, the Bloomfieldians, thought that a linguist should collect observable data, i.e. real utterances, and analyze these data, i.e. segment and classify the physical features of the utterances collected. A body of such data (a set of observed and collected utterances) is a corpus. Using a **corpus** for linguistic investigation is called the “corpus-based” or inductive procedure. In Chomsky’s terminology this means that American structuralism was preoccupied with discovering and describing the E-language aspect of natural languages.

The Bloomfieldians dealt with phonetics, phonology, morphology, and syntax, but rejected semantics, thinking that the study of meaning would only be possible when human knowledge had become far more advanced. The only aspect of meaning that they paid attention to was whether two forms (signs or sign combinations) had the same meaning or different meanings. They used a strictly formal analysis. This was an analysis without reference to meaning, and it was based on an examination of distribution and constituency.

The distribution of a language element (i.e. of a phoneme or morpheme or word) is the sum of all the environments in which it occurs. If two language elements always occur in different environments, i.e. they occur in mutually exclusive environments, then there is not even one environment in which one could replace the other. To put it differently: they never enter into a paradigmatic relationship with each other. In this case we say that the two language elements have totally different distributions: they are in complementary distribution. This means that where one of them can occur, the other cannot occur, and vice versa. For instance, the English phoneme /l/ has two variants, and they are in complementary distribution. The “clear” variant [l] occurs before vowels, e.g.


[ˈhelɪn] *Helen*, and the “dark” variant [ɫ] (which is pronounced with a cupped tongue, i.e. with a raising of the back part of the tongue) occurs elsewhere, i.e. before consonants, e.g. [heɫp] *help* and in word-final position, e.g. [heɫ] *hell*. By contrast, if the distributions of two language elements are not entirely different, i.e. there is at least one common environment in which one could replace the other, the two elements are not in complementary distribution. In this case they are either in contrast or in free variation.

Two language-elements are in **contrast** in a particular unit if replacing one by the other changes the meaning of the unit. For example, English /e/ and /i:/ in the environment /m—t/ are in contrast because /met/ does not mean the same as /miːt/. If however replacing one language element by another in a particular unit does not change the meaning of the unit, they are in free variation in that unit. For instance, the same two phonemes /e/ and /iː/ are in free variation in the environment /-kə'nɒmɪks/, because /i:kə'nɒmɪks/ means the same as /ekə'nɒmɪks/.

The other important method of formal analysis which the Bloomfieldians introduced was constituent analysis. (The Bloomfieldians themselves called it “immediate constituent analysis” or “IC analysis”.) This means cutting syntactic units (or words) into their constituents, then the constituents into their constituents, and so on until we reach the individual words (or morphemes). Cutting a unit into its constituents is based on the test of substitution (replacement). For instance, the sentence *My friend ran home* can be divided into two: [My friend] and [ran home] because *My friend* can be replaced by a simpler constituent, e.g. *Peter*, as in *Peter ran home*; and because *ran home* can also be replaced by a simpler constituent, e.g. *slept*, as in *My friend slept*. So we divide the

sentence into [My friend] and [ran home], and then, through further applications of the substitution test, these parts can be divided into even smaller constituents. Constituent analysis can be visualized in essentially two ways, viz. by bracketings, as in (1), or by tree diagrams, as in (2).

(1) [S[NP[Det My][N friend]] [VP[V ran] [Adv home]]].




The constituents in the representations in (1) and (2) are labelled, S stands for Sentence, NP for Noun Phrase, VP for Verb Phrase, Det for Determiner, N for Noun, V for Verb, and Adv for Adverb. Trees and bracketings do not have to be labelled but the labelled ones are more informative than the unlabeled ones. Constituent analysis was suitable for resolving certain ambiguities, by showing different constituent structures, e.g.: (old (men and women)) vs. ((old men) and women).

2.5 Generative Linguistics

All the analysis and argumentations presented in the Bloomfield's theory seems to be strong and adequate. However, there were lots of ambiguities which constituent analysis could not resolve. For instance, *The lamb is ready to eat.* has two distinct meanings (is ambiguous), but the American structuralists could give it only one analysis: ((The lamb)(is (ready (to eat))))). Their analysis remained on the surface and could not disambiguate structures which were different in the deep.

The growing dissatisfaction with the limitations of structuralist linguistics led to the emergence of a radically new type of linguistic analysis towards the end of the 1950s. This has become known as transformational-generative linguistics, or just **generative linguistics (= generative grammar)**, for short. This kind of analysis distinguishes two levels of syntactic analysis: a surface structure or **S-structure** (which was recognized by the structuralists, too) and an underlying abstract deep structure or **D-structure** (which was not recognized by the structuralists). Transformational-Generative grammar is **transformational** because it explains surface structure as being derived from deep structure by a series of changes: **transformations**. For instance, the S-structure in (3b) is derived from the D-structure in (3a).



The S-structure in (3b) is an ordinary wh-question, whose more abstract, underlying representation is the D-structure in (3a). But the latter can come to the surface unchanged, too, as *He can study what?*, and then it is an **echo wh-question**, which can be used e.g. as a surprised response to *He can study chiromancy*.

In this framework, ambiguous sentences have identical surface structures but different deep structures, according to the different meanings. For instance, the ambiguous sentence *The lamb is ready to eat* (whose two meanings can be paraphrased as '*The lamb can eat*' and '*Somebody can eat the lamb*') is derived from two different deep structures.


Synonymous sentences like *It rained yesterday* and *Yesterday it rained*, however, derived from one common deep structure and differ only on the surface.

Transformational-generative grammar is generative, because it can generate (i.e. produce, define and explicitly characterise) all and only the grammatical sentences of a language. This means that (a) by applying the rules of the grammar, we always get a syntactically well-formed sentence, (b) this kind of grammar generates all the well-formed sentences of a language, i.e. not only those that have been uttered but also those that have not been uttered but could be uttered, and are, thus, potential sentences of the language. The number of possible grammatical sentences in any language at any one time is infinite, but the rules which make this infinite variation possible are finite (otherwise the native speaker would not be able to learn them).

The founder and most influential representative to this day of generative linguistics has been the American linguist Noam **Chomsky**, whose works have found a great many followers all over the world. Since its appearance the theory has been modified and remodified several times and several new proposals have been made and are still being made by Chomsky himself and by others.

As we saw above, the Bloomfieldians were uninterested in general theoretical questions, emphasised the differences between individual languages, and thought that the main purpose of linguistics was to describe individual languages. In contrast, Chomsky holds that linguistics should be primarily concerned with **Universal Grammar**, i.e. with the principles that are the properties of all human languages. One of these principles is **structure-dependence**, which means that operations in a sentence apply to phrases and not just words,

i.e. these operations require a knowledge of the structural relationships of words rather than just their linear sequence. For instance, when English speakers transform a declarative sentence into a yes-or-no interrogative, the auxiliary they move is not simply “the second word” of the declarative sentence, as a superficial observer might think on the basis of (4a), but rather the word after the entire Noun Phrase that occupies the subject-slot of the declarative sentence, as is shown in (4b).



According to Chomsky, a generative grammar is a model for the native speaker’s intuitive knowledge of the language (i.e. his internal grammar), a decisive part of which is Universal Grammar and is genetically inherited. Chomsky calls the native speaker’s language-knowledge **competence** (or – to use his more recent term – I-language). But the knowledge of language, competence, has to be distinguished from the actual use of that knowledge in real-life situations, i.e. from **performance**. Performance is the actual use of competence and it involves individual and situational features, imperfections, errors, memory limitations, time limitations on the length of sentences, life-span limitations on the number of sentences actually produced by the individual, etc. Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance reminds us of Saussure’s distinction between *langue* and *parole*. But while Chomsky uses the term performance in very much the same sense as Saussure used the term *parole*, there is considerable difference between competence and *langue*.

Saussure's langue was static: it was the system of linguistic signs. Chomsky's competence is dynamic: it puts the generation of sentences in the center of attention. Another difference is that Saussure thought of langue as being in the collective consciousness of a community. Chomsky thinks of competence as knowledge whose basis is given to every normal human being by birth, in the sense that its structure is related to the structure of the human mind and so the basis of competence is a universal characteristic of the human species.

On the basis of their competence, native speakers can do several things:

1. They can produce and understand an infinite number of new grammatical sentences in their language.
2. They can distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical formations (He went to London vs. *Went London he to).
3. They can interpret elliptical sentences, i.e. sentences with missing elements (Peter is happy but John isn't).
4. They can perceive ambiguity (The lamb is ready to eat).
5. They can perceive synonymy (The duck crossed the road vs. The road was crossed by the duck).
6. They can idealize utterances, i.e. they can disregard the imperfections and idiosyncratic features of performance and reconstruct the grammatical sentences which the utterances realize (*? The thought of those poor children were really ... WAS really ... bothering me.).

The last point has a very important consequence: generative linguistics has an **I-language** approach to the study of language. Earlier, both Saussure and the American structuralists in the first half of the 20th century were convinced that the way to la langue led through the observation of la

parole. In other words, linguistic analysis had to be based on a corpus of data taken from the linguistic behaviour (actual language-use) of people, i.e. from parole or performance. This can be called the **E-language** approach. By contrast, generative linguists think that linguistics is concerned with far more than what can be found in a corpus. Thus, even if we do use a corpus for linguistic work, we shall have to “idealize” the data, i.e. free them from the imperfections and idiosyncrasies of performance. This is what native speakers automatically do when they understand other native speakers’ utterances. They do so intuitively, on the basis of their competence (or I-language). But then the real task of linguistics should be the study of the native speakers’ competence (and especially the part of it which can be regarded as Universal Grammar). This is more important than the actual utterances found in a corpus. Competence can be examined by asking questions about intuitions. Consequently, the linguist has the right to use his own and other people’s intuitions in linguistic analysis. And if the linguist is a native speaker of the language he examines, he can ask and answer questions about his own intuitions. Examining one’s own intuitions concerning language is a kind of introspection. In other words, generative linguists can base their theories not (only) on empirical facts but on introspection and on native speakers’ intuitions. However, this does not mean that they give up objectivity because their theories can be submitted to subsequent empirical verification. (Only their method is different from the inductive method of the preceding decades: their method is deductive, proceeding from theories to empirical facts.) But the focus of their attention is undoubtedly on I-language: they are interested not so much in the empirical facts themselves as rather in the knowledge that enables speakers to produce those empirical facts.

Since competence resides in the individual language-user's mind and is a device of the reasoning activity of human beings, it is a mental, psychological phenomenon. Consequently, by studying what linguistic competence is and how it works, we are actually studying what the mind is and how the mind works. If language competence is part of the human mind, then the study of this competence, i.e. linguistics, is part of the study of the mind, i.e. psychology. In other words: Chomsky's conclusion is that linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology. Generative linguistics, then, has extended the status of psycholinguistics from being a mere branch of linguistics, to being the dominant branch of modern linguistics.

Phonetics and Phonology, the Study of Sounds and Phonemes

3.1 Phonetics

Phonetics is the science of human speech sounds. It has three subfields or branches.

1. The oldest branch, and also the one which is the most relevant in foreign language teaching, is articulatory phonetics. This examines the articulatory (vocal) organs and their role in the production of speech sounds.
2. The second branch is acoustic phonetics. This deals with the physical properties of speech sounds as they travel through the air in the form of sound waves.
3. The third branch is called auditory phonetics, which examines the way in which human beings perceive speech sounds through the medium of the ear.

When people speak, they produce physically continuous stretches of sound, which those who know the language in which the utterance was made can analyze into strings of individual speech sounds. For instance, the English word *fish*, when pronounced, is a continuous stretch of sound and not [f]+[ɪ]+[ʃ]. Still, speakers of English know that there are three

distinct sounds in that word: [f] and [l] and [ʃ]. The minimal distinct sounds that we distinguish one after the other in the physical continuum of speech are called speech sounds (= phones).

Phonetics attempts to examine all and only the speech sounds used in human languages. For instance, the sound [y] is a human speech sound because it occurs in several languages, including Hungarian, French, German, even though it does not occur in many other languages, e.g. English, Spanish, and Italian. So [y] has to be dealt with in phonetic terms. By contrast, the sounds we produce when we sneeze or belch are not speech sounds in any language, so they have no place in phonetics. The number of speech sounds that phoneticians distinguish in the world's languages is around one hundred.

3.2 The Tasks of Phonetics

The main task of phonetic science is twofold, it is to provide a notation and description for each speech sound. By notation we mean a system of transcription symbols whereby we can make an accurate and unambiguous record of what goes on in speech. This is necessary because conventional letters cannot do this job properly. The correspondence between letters and sounds is indirect. In English, for example, there are 26 basic letters but considerably more speech sounds that we can distinguish. The transcription system which contains symbols for the hundred or so speech sounds that can be distinguished in human language is a special kind of alphabet, known as the International Phonetic Alphabet (= IPA). The following are the phonemes of IPA used for the transcribing words.


International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) ,ɪntəˈnæʃnəl fəˈnetɪk ˈælfəbet

Consonants (pulmonic)

	Bilabial	Labio-dental	Dental	Alveolar	Post-alveolar	Retroflex	Palatal	Velar	Uvular	Pharyngeal	Glottal
Plosive	p b			t d		t̪ d̪	c ɟ	k ɡ	q ɢ		ʔ
Nasal	m	ɱ		n		ɳ	ɲ	ŋ	ɴ		
Trill	ʙ			ɾ					ʀ		
Tap or flap		ⱱ		ɾ		ɽ					
Fricative	ɸ β	f v	θ ð	s z	ʃ ʒ	ʂ ʐ	ç ʝ	x ɣ	χ ʁ	ħ ʕ	h ɦ
Lateral fricative				ɬ ɮ							
Approximant		ʋ		ɹ		ɻ	j	ɰ			
Lateral approximant				l		ɭ	ʎ	ʟ			

In this IPA system each phonetic symbol stands for one and only one speech sound. Sometimes supplementary marks (diacritics) are added to the symbols, e.g. the raised letter h indicates aspiration of the initial sound [t] in the word [t^hu:ɪ] tool. Phonetic transcriptions are enclosed in square brackets: []. They are detailed, and called narrow transcriptions. The degree of detail (narrowness) depends on the analyst's purposes.

The other main aim of phonetics is the description (characterization) of speech sounds. This is done in terms of phonetic features. In order to understand these features, we have to get acquainted with the articulatory organs. These are schematically shown in (1) below. The diagram represents the side-view of the front part of a human head and neck.



One characteristic feature of speech sounds is, for instance, the presence or absence of vocal cord vibration during the production of the sound. The air coming from the lungs by way of the wind-pipe (a) arrives at the larynx (b). This is where the vocal cords are situated, forming an opening between them called the glottis. When the vocal

cords are together and the air stream passing through between them makes them vibrate, the sound produced will be voiced (or [+voice]), e.g. [b, d, g, v, ð, z, ʒ]. When the vocal cords are apart and so the air stream passes through freely, without causing vibration of the vocal cords, the sound produced will be voiceless (or [-voice]), e.g. [p, t, k, f, θ, s, ʃ].

Another feature of speech sounds is, for example, the presence or absence of nasality. The air, leaving the glottis, arrives at a cavity called the pharynx (P), from which it can go on to two further cavities: the nose and the mouth, i.e. the nasal cavity (N) and the oral cavity (O), respectively. These two are separated from each other by the roof of the mouth. The roof has several parts. Just behind the upper front teeth (g) is the alveolar ridge (h), then comes the hard palate or palate (i), followed by the soft palate or velum (j). When the back of the velum, i.e. the uvula (k) is raised, the passage through the nose is cut off and the air can only escape through the mouth. Sounds produced in this way are oral [-nasal], e.g. [b, d, g]. If, however, the back of the velum is lowered, the air can escape through the nose and the mouth. Sounds produced this way are nasal [+nasal], e.g. [m, n, ŋ].

The consonants which occur in the world's languages can be described in terms of place and manner of articulation. Here we shall concentrate on the most important English consonants only. We distinguish eight classes of these consonants according to place of articulation. Bilabials ([p, b, m, w]) are produced between the two lips, labiodentals ([f, v]) between the upper front teeth and the lower lip, dentals ([θ, ð]) between the upper front teeth and the tip of the tongue, alveolars ([t, d, s,

z, n, l, r]) between the alveolar ridge and the front of the tongue, palatoalveolars ([ʃ, ʒ, tʃ, dʒ]) in the postalveolar region, palatals in the area of the hard palate ([j]), velars ([k, g, ŋ]) in the area of the soft palate or velum, and finally glottals ([ʔ], called the 'glottal stop', and [h]) are produced in the glottis. According to **manner of articulation** we distinguish six classes. Plosives (also known as oral stops) [p, b, t, d, k, g, ʔ]: a complete closure is made between two articulatory organs, behind which the air-pressure builds up and is then released explosively. Fricatives (also known as spirants) [f, v, θ, ð, s, z, ʃ, ʒ, h]: two articulatory organs form a narrowing so that the air stream passing through causes friction. Affricates [tʃ, dʒ]: complete closure is made but is released slowly, so that friction can be heard. Nasals (also known as nasal stops) [m, n, ŋ]: complete closure is made somewhere in the mouth but the air escapes continuously through the nose. Liquids: these are sounds of the types [l, r]. Glides [w, j]: there is a narrowing but it is not narrow enough to cause friction.

Plosives, fricatives and affricates are produced with a stricture impeding the flow of air, and therefore they can be called obstruents; while nasals, liquids and glides are produced with a relatively free airflow, and can be called sonorants.

The most important English consonants that we have dealt with are shown in (2). The columns represent the place of articulation, the rows the manner of articulation.


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		Bi-labials	Labio-dentals	Dentals	Alveolars	Palatoalveolars	Palatals	Velars	Glottals
Obstruents	Plosives	p b			t d			k g	ʔ
	Fricatives		f v	θ ð	s z	ʃ ʒ			h
	Affricates					tʃ dʒ			
Sonorants	Nasals	m			n			ŋ	
	Liquids				l r				
	Glides	w					j		


Vowels can be represented with regard to the horizontal and vertical tongue position within the oral cavity. If you raise the front of your tongue as close to the hard palate as you can without actually reaching it, you produce a close (high) front vowel: [i]. If you lower the front of your tongue as far from the hard palate as possible, you get an open (low) front vowel: [a]. Now if you divide the distance between the tongue positions for [i] and [a] into three equal parts, you get the half-close front [e], and the half-open front [ɛ]. If you do the same movements with the back of your tongue, you will get the close back vowel [u], the half-close back [o], the half-open back [ɔ], and the open back [ɑ].

The 8 vowels so obtained are called cardinal vowels. They do not necessarily occur in every language, they should rather be regarded as theoretical vowels or orientation points which indicate the limits within which the tongue can move in the human mouth to produce vowels, and with reference to which all vowels of all languages can be accommodated. The trapezium formed by the cardinal vowels is called the Cardinal Vowel Chart, see (3).

3. Cardinal Vowel Chart



4. English Simple Vowels



In English there are diphthongs as well. A diphthong is a complex vowel during the production of which one tongue position is changed into another but no new syllable is formed. For instance, the vowels in the words *height*, *hate*, *house*, *hose*, i.e. [aɪ, eɪ, aʊ, əʊ], are diphthongs.

It needs to be emphasized that there are far more distinguishable speech sounds (both consonants and vowels) in English than the ones we have presented in (2) and (4), but we have only concentrated on the most important ones. Consonants and vowels together can be called segments. Since phonetics primarily deals

with these, the major part of phonetics is segmental phonetics. But phonetics has to deal with other aspects of human speech as well, viz. aspects characterizing larger units than segments. This kind of phonetics is called suprasegmental phonetics. The suprasegmental aspects of speech include intonation (the meaningful melody of utterances) and stress (the extra prominence of a syllable over the other syllables in a word or phrase).

We have already mentioned these notions in Unit 1, and in this introductory course we are not going to say more about them.

3.2 Phonology

While phonetics deals with the articulatory, acoustic and auditory aspects of actual speech sounds, phonology ignores all non-distinctive detail and limits its attention strictly to the really distinctive speech sounds, i.e. the basic sounds or phonemes, which form systems in a particular language. The key notion of phonology is that of contrast. The concept of distinctiveness is captured by the notion of a phoneme. A phoneme is a distinctive or contrastive sound in a language. What “distinctive” means in this context is that the sound makes a difference in meaning and has communicative value. Different phonemes make contrasts in words. For example, [n], [l] and [t] are all phonemes because they serve to make contrasts in words, as in nab, lab, tab. Here we see how the phonemes of a language are determined, by means of what are called minimal pairs. A minimal pair is a set of different words consisting of all the same sounds except for one. The one sound which contrasts is then determined to be a phoneme since it makes a difference in meaning (it differentiates one word from another). For example, we could

set up a phonetic environment, a sequence of sounds such as [æt]. If we then establish a blank slot word initially, [_at], and substitute different consonants in this slot, we can see if we get different words. If we do, then each of these consonants is a phoneme. Examine the following: [_æt] pat, bat, sat, mat, gnat, fat, that, vat, cat...

We can conclude that [p], [b], [s], [m], [n], [f], [ð], [v], and [k] are all phonemes. And bat and cat, for example, are a minimal pair. The same can be done for vowels with a phonetic environment such as [p_t]: [p_t] pit, peat, pate, pot, pout, put, putt, pat, pet, etc. We can conclude that [ɪ], [i], [eɪ], [ɑ], [aʊ], [ʌ], [æ], [ʊ], and [ɛ] are all distinct phonemes.

A phoneme is an abstract minimal sound unit of a particular language, which, when realized, is capable of distinguishing different words in that language. Phonemes can be discovered by the minimal pair technique. If replacing one sound by another results in a different word, the two sounds represent different phonemes and the two words form a minimal pair. For instance, the English consonants [k] and [s] represent two different phonemes because they distinguish e.g. [li:k] *leak* and [li:s] *lease*, and since the two words are otherwise identical, they form a minimal pair.

By means of the minimal pair technique we can distinguish 44 phonemes in Standard British English. (The pronunciation of Standard British English is sometimes referred to as Received Pronunciation, or just RP; this is the kind of pronunciation which has the highest social prestige). Actually, the so-called “important sounds” of English which we saw in (2) and (4), except for the glottal stop [ʔ], are all phonemes of Standard British English. In addition to them, however, there are a large number of other consonants and vowels in Standard British English which are distinct (i.e. we can distinguish them) but

which are not distinctive (i.e. they do not distinguish English words) and so they are not separate phonemes, only variants of existing phonemes.

When we transcribe speech sounds from the point of view of the phonemes that they represent, we ignore all non-phonemic (i.e. non-distinctive) detail, and use a **phonemic transcription**. This is normally put between slashes: / /. In phonemic transcription we use as many symbols as there are phonemes. Consequently there are fewer symbols in phonemic transcription than in narrow phonetic transcription. For example, the phonemic transcription of the word *tool*, /tu:l/, omits non-phonemic details such as the aspiration of the initial [t] or the darkness of the final [ɫ]. These would be included in a narrow phonetic transcription: [t^hu:ɫ].

The myriads of actual speech sounds or phones that realize a phoneme in a language can be grouped into a small number of **allophones**. Allophones are the positional alternants of a phoneme: they are phonetically similar and are in complementary distribution. For instance, in Standard British English the phoneme /l/ has two allophones: a clear [l], which occurs before vowels, and a dark [ɫ], which occurs elsewhere, for example *lip* [lɪp] and *Helen* [ˈhelən] vs. *film* [fɪɫm] and *hill* [hɪɫ]. Other examples include the English phoneme /p/, which also has two allophones: an aspirated [p^h] at the beginning of a stressed syllable and an unaspirated [p] elsewhere, as in *port* [p^hɔ:t] and *sport* [spɔ:t]. Another example: any English vowel gets a nasal allophone when it is adjacent to a nasal consonant but an oral allophone elsewhere, for example *pen* [p^hèn] vs. *pet* [p^het].

Allophones can be considered as nondistinctive (noncontrastive) variants of a phoneme, because substituting one allophone for another allophone of the same phoneme

will not result a different word (Brinton, 2000) . For example, replacing [th] with [t] in top, or [t] with [t^h] in stop, will not lead to different words, just a slightly odd-sounding one. (Of course, substituting one allophone for another allophone of a different phoneme would result in a different word; replacing [t^h] with [k^h] in top would give cop.) The allophones of a phoneme are conditioned by the environment and so their properties are predictable or redundant. They never occur in a paradigmatic relationship with one another and so they cannot be in contrast. That is why they do not perform a distinctive function, and cannot be separate phonemes in the same language. (However, what is non-distinctive in one language may be distinctive in another.) Since allophonic variations are not reflected in phonemic transcription, the examples given in this paragraph are phonemically transcribed as /ɪp/, /ˈhelən/, /fɪɫm/, /hɪɫ/, /p^hɔ:t/, /spɔ:t/, /p^hèn/, /p^het/.

From the adjectives phonetic and phonemic the terms etic /ˈetɪk/ and emic /ˈi:mɪk/ have been abstracted, referring to two kinds of approach which can be distinguished in various types of linguistic studies. The **etic approach** deals with all data of a given kind, while the **emic approach** studies the structuring of data into systemic abstract entities on the basis of their distinctive power in a given language. In the field of sounds the emic approach is concerned with phonemes, the etic approach with allophones and phones.

Structuralist phonology (i.e. the phonology of Structuralist Linguistics, especially in the 1950s and 1960s) looked upon phonemes as the ultimate building blocks of language. Generative phonology (i.e. the phonology in Generative Linguistics) has claimed that phonemes should be decomposed into bundles (sets) of binary distinctive features. (Binary here means ‘having two values’.) Take, for example,

which is an allophonic change turning [bɪn] into [bĩn], can be described as (7). (V stands for vowel, C for consonant.) The rule expresses that a vowel becomes nasal before a nasal consonant.

7. Nasal Assimilation

$$V \rightarrow [+nasal] / \text{ ______ } C$$
$$[+nasal]$$

CHAPTER 4

Morphology, the Study of Morphemes and Words

4.1 Words

The term **word** can be used in different senses. On the one hand, vocabulary items, i.e. entries in the dictionary (e.g. *drive*), are called words, but on the other hand the different inflected forms of a word (e.g. *drive*, *drives*, *driving*, *drove*, *driven*) are also called word. Even further, some words, e.g. (*doghouse*), are said to be written in two “words”. In order to avoid confusion, we should use the following terms: lexeme, syntactic word, and orthographic word.

1. A **lexeme** is a unit of the lexicon (an entry in the dictionary, a vocabulary item), which is an uninflected abstract form that underlies all its inflected variants. To distinguish lexemes from their inflected variants it is customary to use capital letters to indicate lexemes. For instance, the lexeme DRIVE underlies the inflected variants *drive*, *drives*, *driving*, *drove*, and *driven*.
2. A **syntactic word** is an inflected variant of a lexeme (including the zero-inflection), so *drive*, *drives*, *driving*, *drove*, *driven* are considered as syntactic words. **Inflection**

means varying the shape of a lexeme in such a way that its grammatical relation to other lexemes within the phrase or sentence becomes clear. Consider the sentence in (1):

(1) He drives it.

In this sentence the verb *drives* is a predicate in the 3rd person singular present tense, preceded by *he* (the subject pronoun in the nominative case), and followed by *it* (the object pronoun in the accusative case). All three words are inflected, even the apparently uninflected *he* can be regarded as zero-inflected.

The whole set of inflected variants of a lexeme is called a paradigm. The form of *drive*, *drives*, *driving*, *drove*, *driven* constitute the paradigm of *DRIVE*. The members of such a paradigm are syntactic words.

3. The third sense in which the word *word* is popularly used is a unit of writing: it is a stretch of graphic symbols with a space on either side and no space within. This will be called **orthographic word**. For example, the lexeme *LIFE INSURANCE* is two orthographic words, but the two lexemes in *I'm* are just one orthographic word.

The three senses of the word *word* are not equally important. In our linguistic studies it is only the lexemes and syntactic words that have to be taken into consideration, and orthographic words are irrelevant. Lexemes can be likened to **types**, syntactic words to **tokens**, i.e. particular instances of the abstract types. Lexemes (and their inflected variants, the syntactic words) belong to different **syntactic categories** (= word classes, parts of speech).

Nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and prepositions are **content words**, others, e.g. conjunctions, pronouns, auxiliaries are **function words**. Traditional grammarians tried to define

the syntactic categories of lexemes on the basis of meaning. (Just to remind you, e.g. a noun was said to be “the name of a person, place or thing”, which, however, is blatantly false in the case of many words that native speakers use as nouns.) On the other hand, American structuralists defined the syntactic categories of lexemes not on the basis of meaning but on the basis of form. This involved an examination of word endings (e.g. any word ending in *-ness* is a noun), and of the ways in which the words enter into larger constructions (e.g. any word that fits the dash in the frame *The — is there.* is a noun).

4.2 Morphemes

To start with a working definition, which we will make more precise later, we can say that **morphemes** are the smallest meaningful units of language, which cannot be subdivided without losing their meaning. They are abstract units, indicated between braces: { }. Lexemes and syntactic words are composed of one or more than one morpheme. For instance, the lexeme TEACHER consists of two morphemes: {teach}{-er}, the lexeme ALBATROSS consists of one: {albatross}. When we realize morphemes, we produce morphs. **Morphs** are the physical realizations of morphemes. The billions of actual morphs realizing an abstract morpheme by actual speakers in actual situations can be grouped into a few phonologically different shapes, so called allomorphs. **Allomorphs** are the positional alternants of a morpheme: they have the same meaning and are in complementary distribution. (The latter means that they occur in mutually exclusive environments.)

There is a perfect parallel between the morph – allomorph – morpheme series on the one hand, and the phone – allophone – phoneme series on the other. Just like the phone (speech sound) and the allophone are the concern of the **etic**

approach and the phoneme of the **emic approach**, the morph and the allomorph are the concern of the etic approach and the morpheme of the emic approach.

The phonological differences between the allomorphs of a morpheme are often due to the phonological environment, i.e. the phonological differences are often **phonologically conditioned**. For instance, {-s}, the abstract plural morpheme in English has three regular allomorphs. When the last sound of the noun is a sibilant (i.e. /s, z, ʃ, ʒ, tʃ, dʒ/), the allomorph will be /ɪz/, as in e.g. *boxes, bushes*. When the last sound of the noun is a voiceless non-sibilant, the allomorph will be /s/, as in *books, plates*. And elsewhere, i.e. where the last sound of the noun is a voiced non-sibilant, the plural morpheme will be realized as /z/, as in *bags, apples, potatoes*. In other cases the phonological differences of the allomorphs can be due to **lexical conditioning**. For instance, the plural morpheme is realized as /ən/ when it is attached to the noun *ox*. Here it is not the last sound of the noun that is responsible for the alternation but the entire lexeme *OX*. The phonological difference of the allomorphs can also be caused by **morphological conditioning**. This happens e.g. in the plural noun **houses**, i.e. {house}{-s}, where the first morpheme is realized as /haʊz/ before the plural morpheme, although it is realized as /haus/ when it stands alone as a singular noun. Here one morpheme affects the realization of another.

Morphemes can be grouped into two types on the basis of whether or not they can form monomorphemic words.

1. If they can occur by themselves as whole words, (i.e. if they can form monomorphemic words), then we call them **free morphemes**. For instance, {house}, {albatross}, {kangaroo}, {lullaby}, {table}, etc. are free morphemes.

2. There are also morphemes which must be attached to other morphemes within words, these are called **bound morphemes**. For example, the plural morpheme {-s}, or the adverb-forming morpheme {-ly} are bound morphemes.


Most bound morphemes are **affixes**. In English, these are either suffixes (following stems) or prefixes (preceding stems). **Suffixes** in English are either inflectional or derivational. If you add an inflectional suffix to a stem, you do not create a new lexeme, you only produce another inflected variant (i.e. another syntactic word) of the same lexeme.



For example, {-s} is an inflectional suffix, because by adding it to the stem {boy}, we get *boys*, which is just another syntactic word belonging to the paradigm of BOY. However, if you add a derivational suffix to a stem, you create another lexeme. For example, {-hood} is a derivational suffix, because by adding it to the stem {boy}, you produce a new lexeme BOYHOOD, which is the starting point of a new paradigm. **Prefixes** in Present-Day English are always derivational, e.g. {en-}, added to the stem {joy} gives rise to a new lexeme ENJOY.

A **stem** is that part of a word which remains if we remove the suffix or prefix that has entered the word last. The stem is not necessarily a single morpheme, e.g. the stem of *unfriendliness* is *unfriendly*, the stem of *unfriendly* is *friendly*, and the stem of *friendly* is *friend*. If we remove all affixes, we arrive at the absolute stem, called **root** (also known as

base), which is always a single morpheme. Thus, the root of *unfriendliness* is {friend}, underlined in (2).



The root is usually a free morpheme (as in e.g. *unfriendliness*), but there are also roots which are bound. For example, in words like *include*, *conclude*, *preclude*, *exclude*, etc. the prefix {in-}, {con-}, {pre-}, {ex-}, etc. is followed by the root {-clude}, which is not a free form since it never occurs alone as a monomorphemic word. Moreover, the meaning of {-clude} is unclear, in fact it is dubious whether it has any meaning at all. (If you know Latin you may think that {-clude} means 'to close', but this can hardly be felt in e.g. *conclude*.)

Besides, native speakers of English do not think of Latin when they use such words.) Although we do not know if {-clude} has a meaning or what that meaning is, we still regard it as a morpheme, because its pronunciation /klu:d/ systematically varies with /klu:s/ when it is followed by the suffix {-ive}, as in *inclusive* or *conclusive*, and with /kluːZ/ when followed by the suffix {-ion}, as in *inclusion*, *conclusion*. To put it in another way, {-clude} has allomorphic variants: /kluːd/, /kluːs/ and /kluːZ/, which shows that it is a morpheme.

Since, as we have just seen, the criterion of meaning cannot always be used, we shall revise our original definition, which we gave at the beginning of this section, in the following way: **Morphemes** are the smallest meaningful units of

language or the units of allomorphic variation, which cannot be subdivided without losing their meaning or losing their allomorphic variability. To put it more informally, morphemes are recurring word-parts which have some constant variants, and which are typically but not necessarily meaningful. This definition will cover all morphemes that we have considered so far.

4.3 Segmentability of Words into Morphemes

There are words which are easy to segment into morphemes, e.g. {un-}{friend}{-li}{-ness}, {girl}{-s}, {smoke}{-ed}, etc. Languages in which most words are of this kind (i.e. in which most words are sequences of separable morphemes) are called **agglutinating languages**. There are also many words which are monomorphemic, i.e. which are composed of single morphemes. In these, morphemes coincide with words, e.g. *go*, *coffee*, *elephant*. Languages in which most words consist of single morphemes are called **isolating languages**. Classical Chinese is one of them.

Finally, there are words in which the constituent abstract morphemes are fused together in an inseparable way, e.g. the English words *took* and *mice* consist of {take}{-ed} and {mouse}{-s}, respectively. Also, there are words in which some morphs represent inseparable fusions of abstract morphemes, e.g. the Russian nominal inflectional suffix -u, as in e.g. *lampu* ('lamp-Acc.'), simultaneously realizes {Feminine}, {Singular}, {Accusative}. Languages in which the fusion of morphemes is typical are called **fusional** (= inflecting) **languages**. Latin is a typical fusional language. Of course, those language types, established on the basis of the morphological make-up of the majority of their words, are not pure types. English, for instance, is a mixture of all three, but it is predominantly

(statistically) isolating because a large part of its words are monomorphemic.

4.4 Word Formation

In addition to the borrowing of **loanwords** from other languages, e.g. ALCOHOL from Arabic) or the introduction of **coinages** (lexemes artificially invented, e.g. XEROX), there are also ways in which we can produce new lexemes, making use of old ones. These ways are called **word formation processes**. We shall now briefly discuss the most common word formation processes.

One of the major word-forming processes is **derivation** (=affixation), i.e. creating a new lexeme by means of adding a derivational prefix or suffix to an old lexeme. For instance, the lexeme KINGDOM is derived from the stem {king}, to which the derivational suffix {-dom} has been added, or the lexeme IMPOLITE is derived from the stem {polite}, with the derivational prefix {in-}, or the lexeme UNHAPPINESS is derived from the stem UNHAPPY (itself derived from HAPPY), by adding the derivational suffix {-ness}. The lexemes produced by affixation can be called **derivative words**, or simply just **derivatives**.

It can happen that a lexeme is assigned to another word class (part of speech) without changing its form. This is called **conversion** (also known as zero affixation), which is extremely common in English, see e.g. BOTTLE (N) → BOTTLE (V), DAILY (A) → DAILY (N), MILK (N) → MILK (V). A special subtype of conversion is called **approximate conversion**, in which lexemes undergo a small but systematic change in pronunciation and are thereby assigned to a different word class. Sometimes this “small change” is a stress shift (with some concomitant changes in vowel quality), as in e.g.

SUS'PECT (V) and 'SUSPECT (N), PER'MIT (V) and 'PERMIT (N), CON'VICT (V) and 'CONVICT (N), 'ENVELOPE (N) and EN'VELOP (V), etc. Another kind of approximate conversion is changing the voice value of the final fricative in some lexemes, having a voiceless final fricative in nouns and a voiced one in verbs, e.g. HALF (N) /hɑ:f/ _ HALVE (V) /hɑ:v/, USE (N) /ju:s/_ USE (V) /ju:z/, WREATH (N) /ri:ə/_ WREATHEV /ri:ð/. Changing the voice value of the final fricative is sometimes accompanied by vowel change, too, e.g. GLASS (N) /glɑ:s/ → GLAZE (V) /gleiz/.

The next major word-forming process is **compounding**. This means bringing together two roots or two lexemes to produce a new lexeme, called a **compound**, as in e.g. 'BLACKMAIL, 'GOLDFISH, 'WHITE HOUSE (where the president of the US lives), 'HAY FEVER, 'CHRISTMAS-TREE, etc. Members of a compound may be compounds themselves, cf. e.g. 'RAILWAY-STATION ATTENDANT, etc. Typically (but not always) compounds bear the main stress on their initial member. They are usually (but not always) written in one orthographic word.

Other word-formation processes include clipping, blending, backformation and the formation of acronyms. **Clipping** means shortening a lexeme and thus producing a more informal variant, e.g. PHOTOGRAPH → PHOTO, INFLUENZA → FLU, EXAMINATION → EXAM, etc. **Blending** is putting together lexemes but at least one of these lexemes is present only in a fragmentary form, as in e.g. FOG + SMOKE → SMOG, BREAKFAST + LUNCH → BRUNCH, etc. The lexemes so produced are **blends**. A kind of reverse affixation takes place in **backformation**, which means establishing, on the basis of analogy with derivatives, the apparently existing stem of a lexeme which looks like a derivative, although it is not a real derivative. For instance, pairs like SUPERVISION (N) and SUPERVISE (V) suggest that if there is a word TELEVISION

(N), there should also be a word TELEVISE (V), although the former was not derived from the latter. We say that TELEVISE has been backformed from TELEVISION. Similarly, DONATE has been backformed from DONATION (by analogy with pairs such as CREATION and CREATE). Finally, **acronym formation** means forming a lexeme from the initial letters or larger parts of words; the lexemes so created are **acronyms**.

Many of these are pronounced as words, e.g. RADAR for 'radio detecting and ranging', NATO for 'North Atlantic Treaty Organization'. In many cases, however, they are pronounced as sequences of letters, e.g. BBC, YMCA, etc.

Syntax, the Study of the Structure of Phrases and Sentences

5.1 Sentences and Phrases

Syntax is the study of sentence structure. Sentences are composed not directly out of words but of constituents which may consist of more than one word, called phrases. A phrase is an expression which is a constituent in a sentence and is the expansion of a head (i.e. key word). For instance, the constituent *the king* in (1), or the constituents *my brother* and *an expensive car* in (2) are Noun Phrases, abbreviated as NPs, because their key elements are the nouns (Ns) *king*, *brother* and *car*, respectively.¹ It can happen that a phrase is realised by a single word, for example the NPs *John*, *Mary* and *apples* in (3) consist of the Ns *John*, *Mary* and *apples*, and nothing else. In (4) *he* is a special NP because its head is a pronoun rather than a noun.

- (1) *The king laughed.*
- (2) *My brother bought an expensive car.*
- (3) *John gave Mary apples.*
- (4) *He went home.*

(1)-(4) are sentences. The terms **sentence** and **clause** can be used synonymously. A sentence or clause is an expression which minimally contains a subject and a predicate, and which may also contain other types of elements, viz. complements and adjuncts. For instance, (1) consists of just a subject and a predicate. The NP *the king* is the **subject**, and the Verb Phrase (VP), composed of a single verb (V) *laughed*, is the **predicate**.

A **complement** is a constituent whose presence is structurally “dictated” (required or licensed) by a particular word. The presence of the complement “follows” from the presence of the word which it is a complement of. For instance, in (2) above the NP *my brother* is the subject, the V *bought* is the predicate, and the NP *an expensive car* is a complement, more particularly a direct object, of the verb *bought*. An object is a particular kind of complement. In (3) above the subject is the NP *John*, the predicate is the V *gave*, and there are two complements, the NP *Mary*, functioning as an indirect object, and the NP *apples* functioning as a direct object. In (4) the complement of the V *went* is the Adverb Phrase (AdvP) *home*, consisting of the single adverb (Adv) *home*.

The subject and the complement(s) together are said to be the arguments of the predicate. **Arguments** are the participants (entities) that are necessarily involved in the situation identified by the predicate. For example, in (2) the predicate *bought* has two arguments: the subject (somebody did the buying), and the object (something was bought). In English, subjects typically occur in the **nominative case** (*I, he, etc.*), whereas objects occur in the **accusative case** (*me, him, etc.*), but observable case-marking is restricted to pronouns. Another difference between subjects and complements is that, in English, verbs agree with their subjects in person and number but do not agree with their complements. Also,

subjects in English typically precede verbs, while complements follow them.

In addition to the subject, verb and complement(s), the sentence or clause may also contain constituents which are not structurally required by the verb but add optional information about place, time, manner, purpose, etc. Such constituents are called **adjuncts**. Some of these function as adverbials, e.g. the Prepositional Phrase (PP) *on Tuesday* in (5) is a time adverbial, the Adverb Phrase (AdvP) *very quickly* in (6) is a manner adverbial. Some of the adjuncts function as attributes within noun phrases, e.g. the Adjective Phrase (AP), realized by a single Adjective (A) *expensive* in (5), is an attribute of car.

(5) *My brother bought an expensive car on Tuesday.*


(6) *He went home very quickly.*

The terms subject, predicate, object (direct and indirect), *adverbial*, *attribute*; *complement* and *adjunct* refer to **grammatical functions** which constituents may perform in the sentence, whereas terms such as *NP*, *VP*, *AP*, *AdvP*, *PP*, *N*, *V*, *A*, *Adv*, *P*, etc. refer to **syntactic categories**, i.e. they name the grammatical category to which the constituent belongs. These two sets of terms are fairly independent of each other, e.g. an NP can function as subject, or as object, or as the complement of a preposition, or even as adverbial (e.g. the NP *last year*). Similarly, the function of **adverbial** can be performed by an AdvP (*very quickly*), a PP (*on Tuesday*), an NP (*last year*) or even by an embedded clause (e.g. *when I was writing a letter*).

5.2 Representation


The constituent structure of sentences can be represented in essentially two ways: by means of labelled **tree diagrams**, and by means of labelled **bracketings**. Although the two ways of representation are logically equivalent, we prefer tree diagrams because they help visualize structure better than bracketings do. Tree diagrams are like uprooted trees, with branches and nodes. The **nodes** in a tree diagram are the topmost point, the bottom points, and all those intermediate points at which the tree branches. The **labels** are the abbreviated names of the categories to which the constituents belong. The new labels in (7) are S, D, Pron, Aux, and DegP; these stand for Sentence, Determiner, Pronoun, Auxiliary, and Degree Phrase, respectively. Please note that the complements in (7b), (7c), (7d), viz. *an expensive car*, *Mary*, *apples*, *home*, are sisters of the verb, while the adjuncts, viz. *on Tuesday* and *very quickly* in (7e) and (7f), are adjoined to the VP, with which they form a higher VP.

(7) a.




[s[NP[D The]][N king]] [vp[v laughed]].

b.




c.





[s[NP[N John]][vp[v gave][NP [N Mary]] [NP [N apples]]]].

d.



[s[NP[Pron He]][vp[v went][AdvP[Adv home]]]].




In the last example, (7f), the auxiliary *will* stands as a separate constituent outside the VP, although we may intuitively think the auxiliary should be part of the VP. One of the reasons why we analyse it as being outside the VP is that the VP may be deleted independently of the Aux, see e.g. (8).

(8) *Speaker A: Will he go home very quickly?*

Speaker B: Yes, he will go home very quickly.

When we do not want to specify the internal structure of a particular constituent, we may replace the part of the tree diagram corresponding to it by a triangle. For instance, if, for

any reason, we wish to ignore the internal structure of the VP *go home very quickly* in (7f), we may use a triangle for this part of the sentence, see (7f', to be read as “seven-ef-prime”).



[S[NP[_{Pron} He]] [Aux will] [VP go home very quickly]].

A node in a tree is said to **dominate** (i.e. contain) all the nodes below it that are linked to it by a line. A string of words (which consists of minimally one word) is a **constituent** in a tree if there is a node which exclusively dominates it, i.e. dominates all and only the words in that string. For instance, in (7f) each word is a separate constituent because each one is exclusively dominated by a node (*he* by the node *Pron*, *will* by the node *Aux*, *go* by the node *V*, *home* by the node *Adv*, *very* by the node *Deg*, and *quickly* by the node *Adv*), but the strings *go home* and *very quickly* are also constituents because they are exclusively dominated by the lower VP and the AdvP, respectively, and the string *go home very quickly* is a constituent, too, because it is exclusively dominated by the higher VP. However, the words *home very* do not form a constituent in (7f) because there is no node in this tree which would dominate these two words and only these two words.

When a node dominates lower nodes without the intervention of intermediate nodes, we speak about **immediate domination**. A string of words is called an **immediate constituent** (IC) in a tree when there is a node

which immediately dominates all and only the words in that string. Thus, the immediate constituents of the sentence in (7f) are *He*, *will*, and *go home very quickly*, because these are the NP, Aux and VP which are immediately dominated by the sentence. The sentence is “mother” to its immediate constituents, the immediate constituents are “daughters” to the sentence, and “sisters” to each other. The immediate constituents (i.e. daughters) of the VP *go home very quickly* are the lower VP *go home* and the AdvP *very quickly*. The immediate constituents of the lower VP *go home* are the V *go* and the AdvP *home*, and those of the AdvP *very quickly* are the DegP *very* and the Adv *quickly*.

5.3 Simple and Complex Sentences


Until now, all the constituents (apart from the topmost ones) within our example sentences have been phrases and lexical items of various kinds: NPs and Ns, VPs and Vs, APs and As, AdvPs and AdvS, PPs and Ps, DegPs and DegS, Auxes and Ds. None of the constituents was a sentence (S). Therefore we can say that all our examples so far have been simple sentences. A **simple sentence** is a sentence which contains no lower sentence (clause) embedded in it; to put it in another way, it is a sentence which has no S-node other than the topmost S-node in it.

However, it can happen that a non-topmost constituent within a sentence is itself a sentence. This is the case in (9), where the complement (more precisely the object) of the verb *believes* is not an NP but an S. This lower sentence (S2) functions as a complement clause within the higher sentence (S1).

(9) [S1 Peter believes [S2 that you will buy a car]].

The phenomenon in which a constituent contains constituents of the same category as itself is known as **recursion**. For instance, in our previous examples (7e) and (7f) we saw that a VP contained a lower VP. In (9), however, recursion applies to the category S, so here we can speak about sentential or clausal recursion. A sentence containing a lower sentence embedded in it is called a **complex sentence**. (9) is a complex sentence, because it contains two sentences: a higher one, called **matrix clause**: *Peter believes (that) you will buy a car*, and a lower one, called **embedded clause** or **subordinate clause** (or just **subclause**, for short): *(that) you will buy a car*. It can happen that a subclause has its own subclause and so the upper subclause is the matrix clause of the lower, as in (10), whose simplified tree representation is given in (11).

(10) [S1 Peter believes [S2 that you will buy a car [S3 when you come back from America]]].



The topmost matrix clause minus the subclause it contains is also known as the **main clause**. So in both (9) and (10) the main clause is *Peter believes ...* Let us now consider two different kinds of subclause in (12a) and (12b).

- (12) a. *I didn't know [George/he collects stamps].*
b. *I've never known [George/him collect stamps].*

In (12a) the verb *collects* carries the inflectional suffix *-s*, which shows that the verb is inflected for agreement with its subject (third person singular) and simultaneously for present tense. We regard **tense** as an inflection on the first auxiliary or, if there is no auxiliary, on the verb in the sentence, consequently we distinguish only two tenses in English: present tense, e.g. *collect-s* and *collect-0* or *will-0*, and past tense, e.g. *collect-ed*, or *will-ed* = *would*.³ By contrast, in (12b) the verb *collect* does not agree with *George* and it is tenseless. The verb in (12b) is uninflected for agreement and tense. A further difference is that in (12a) the subject of the embedded clause, *George*, can be replaced by a pronoun in the nominative case: *he*, but in (12b) *George* can only be replaced by a pronoun in the accusative case: *him*.

In (13a) the auxiliary *will* is inflected for tense (it is in the present tense: *will-0*, its past tense form would be: *would*, i.e. *will-ed*). This is in contrast with the untensed particle *to* of the infinitive in (13b). And just like in (12a) and (12b), the subject of the bracketed clause, *George*, can be replaced by the nominative case pronoun *he* in (13a) and the accusative case pronoun *him* in (13b).

- (13) a. *I expect [George will win]. / I expect [he will win].*
b. *I expect [George to win]. / I expect [him to win].*

From (12) and (13) we can conclude that sentences or clauses can be finite and nonfinite. A **finite clause** has a subject in the nominative case and contains a verb or an auxiliary inflected for tense/agreement. A **non-finite clause** does not have a nominative subject and does not contain a verb or auxiliary inflected for tense / agreement. The subclauses in

(12a) and (13a) are finite, whereas those in (12b) and (13b) are non-finite.

The subject of an English non-finite subclause can be an invisible pronoun called **PRO** (pronounced: ‘big pro’), too, as in (14a) and (14b).

(14) a. [*PRO to swim here*] is dangerous.

b. We want [*PRO to buy a new printer*].

In (14a) the PRO has a general interpretation (‘anyone’), whereas in (14b) it inherits the features of its **antecedent**, the main clause subject *we*, and so PRO, like *we*, is also first person plural. PRO satisfies the requirement that we have set up for the subjects of non-finite clauses: it is not a subject in the nominative case.

Non-finite verb forms are the bare infinitive and *to*-infinitive forms (e.g. (*to*) *write*), the *-ing* form (e.g. *writing*), and the *-en* form (e.g. *written*) of verbs. (Though the latter two are inflected, they are not inflected for tense and agreement!) To sum up: the bracketed subclauses in (12b), (13b), (14a) and (14b) are non-finite, those in (9), (10), (12a) and (13a) are finite. All the main clauses are finite.

Finally, consider the bracketed subclause in (15), *which we saw last week*. This is part of the NP *the shoes which we saw last week*.

(15) [*S1 I’ve bought [NP the shoes [S2 which we saw last week]]*].

Here the NP itself is the object (complement) of the matrix verb *bought*. The subclause modifies (is an adjunct to) the noun *shoes*. Since *which* relates to (refers back to) *shoes*, it is called a Relative Pronoun and the subclause which contains it is called a **Relative Clause**. More precisely, we can say it

is a Defining (or Restrictive) Relative Clause because it helps identify the referent of the word *shoes*, i.e. tells us which particular shoes the speaker is actually talking about.

5.4 Compound (Coordinated) Sentences

A compound or coordinated sentence contains two or more, equally important, lower sentences (clauses) placed side by side in coordination. There are essentially three kinds of relationship between the coordinated clauses: additive, adversative, and disjunctive. The label *Conj* stands for conjunction.

(16) *Additive*: [S [S *Her daughter was a teacher*] [Conj *and*] [S *her son was studying arts*]].

(17) *Adversative*: [S [S *I asked him*] [Conj *but*] [S *he refused*]].

(18) *Disjunctive*: [S [S *I can go to my friends*] [Conj *or*] [S *my friends can come to me*]].

5.5 Sentence and Utterance

Sentences have to be distinguished from utterances. A **sentence** is any string of words produced by the sentence-forming rules of a language, these rules are stored in native speakers' competence. (By **competence** we mean the native speaker's intuitive knowledge of language). So sentences are constructs of competence, they are ideal, abstract entities. For instance, *Peter smokes cheap cigars* is an English sentence because it has the structure of an English sentence.

By contrast, an **utterance** is typically the physical realisation of a sentence in a real situation of language use, i.e. in performance (**Performance** is the actual use of competence and it involves individual and situational factors).

Since utterances belong to performance, in spontaneous speech they often contain imperfections, such as hesitations, false starts, lack of concord, etc., especially if the speaker is tired or excited or embarrassed.

“Incorrect” utterances are often made by native speakers but they do not seem to matter because, on the basis of their competence, the native speaker-hearers automatically interpret the incorrect utterances into a meaningful information. That is why such mistakes are usually not corrected and often not even noticed. The utterances we make are not necessarily the realizations of complete sentences. It may happen that sentences are left unfinished because the speakers change their minds in the middle of the sentence and begin a new one, or because they are interrupted by someone, or because they are shot dead before they have finished, etc. So it may happen that an utterance consists of a fragment of a sentence or that parts of it belong to different languages. **Ellipsis** (= omission) of predictable constituents is quite common.

Semantics, the Study of Meaning

6.1 Kinds of Meaning

The term semantics comes from Greek *semantikos*, which means ‘meaningful, significant’. **Semantics** is the study of the meaning of meaningful units. It is, however, notoriously difficult to define what **meaning** is, and linguistics – though it has offered several (partial) solutions –, is still searching for a satisfactory definition.

Meaning is not homogeneous. The most important, central kind of meaning can be called **cognitive meaning**. In the case of declarative sentences, this is a state of affairs described by the sentence, which can be true or false. The cognitive meaning of a sentence is sometimes called **propositional meaning** or **proposition**. In the case of words, cognitive meaning is the contribution that the word (lexeme) systematically makes to the cognitive meaning of sentences. The cognitive meaning of lexemes is sometimes called **sense**.

The sentence in (1) describes a state of affairs, and its cognitive meaning is the set of conditions which have to be fulfilled to make the sentence true.

(1) *The girl went to the garden.*

There are other kinds of meaning, too. For instance, we can say (2), which is different from (1) in terms of **stylistic meaning**, although cognitively identical with it. Or, we can say (3a) and (3b), which, being a question and an imperative, respectively, cannot be treated as being either true or false, but they can be claimed to have a questioning and a commanding **speech act meaning**, respectively. Or, we can say (4), where, in addition to the cognitive meaning that the sentence has, we have considerable **emotive (affective) meaning**, too (expressed not only by the word *wow* but also by its special intonation).

(2) *The damsel made her way to the garden. (formal, archaic style)*

(3) a. *Did the girl go to the garden? (question)*

b. *Let the girl go to the garden. (command)*

(4) *Wow! The girl went to the garden! (emotional)*

By a somewhat arbitrary decision, we claim that semantics is concerned with cognitive meaning, while the other kinds of meaning are the concern of pragmatics. In the present chapter we shall only deal with cognitive meaning.

6.2 Approaches to Word Meaning

It has often been thought that word meaning is primary and sentence meaning secondary. Let us examine this assumption. We distinguish two approaches based on the

primacy of word (lexeme) meaning: the referential theory and the conceptual theory.

The **referential theory** of word meaning assumes that lexemes mean what they refer to (i.e. what they “name”). This view concentrates on the **referents** (= extensions, denotata) of lexemes. This seems correct in the case of proper names, e.g. the name *Buckingham Palace* refers to the object Buckingham Palace in London. The theory can be extended to non-names as well: common nouns (e.g. *boy*) can be regarded as referring to sets of individual objects, verbs (e.g. *eat*) as referring to actions, adjectives (e.g. *big*) as referring to properties of individuals, and adverbs (e.g. *happily*) as referring to properties of actions. There are, however, serious problems with this theory. There are lexemes that do not refer to anything in the extralinguistic world, e.g. *fairy*, or lexemes that refer to something that used to exist in the past but no longer exists today, e.g. *dinosaur*, but we cannot deny that they have meaning. And, last but not least, there are lexemes which perform grammatical functions in sentences (so called **function words**, such as *if*, *very*, *why*, *and*, etc.), and can in no way be thought of as referring to anything in the world. But they do have meaning.

The other approach is the **conceptual theory** of word meaning, which is based on the **concepts** with which lexemes are associated. Under this theory what a lexeme means is the sum of the most essential features of the concept associated with the lexeme, i.e. a set of **semantic features**, (= intension) which native speakers have to know and agree upon. These features are pieces of information by which the meaning of a lexeme can be – at least partially – specified. Breaking up the meaning of a lexeme (i.e. the concept associated with it) into semantic features is called **componential analysis** (=

lexical decomposition, intensional definition). For instance, native speakers of English agree that the meaning of the noun *assassin* contains the following semantic features: 'person' who 'murders' 'important people'. Or, the semantic features of the verb *die* are: 'animate being' 'becomes' 'not alive'. Or, the semantic features of the noun *man* are: 'male', 'adult', 'human'. The semantic features need not be scientifically correct. Consider, for example, the lexeme *whale*, whose popular conceptualization does not necessarily contain the feature 'mammal' (many speakers are not aware of this), although the feature 'mammal' is undoubtedly part of the scientific definition of what a whale is.

The conceptual theory also has its problems. The most obvious one is that a large number of lexemes are not associated with concepts at all. Again we can think of many function words that are meaningful because they affect the meaning of sentences (e.g. *if*, *very*, *why*, *and*, etc.) but are not definable in terms of concepts or essential features of concepts. And proper names like *George Bush* or *The Louvre* also contribute to the meaning of sentences, but they are not associated with concepts.

From this it follows that we cannot propose a definition of word meaning suitable for all words, without taking sentence meaning into consideration. Since word meaning cannot be given an independent characterization, our original assumption, viz. that word meaning is primary, has to be replaced by the view that sentence meaning is primary. If we give sentence meaning an independent characterization, then the meaning of any word can be defined as the contribution it systematically makes to the meaning of the sentences in which it occurs. This will cover not only the meaning of content words but the meaning of function words and the meaning of

proper names, too. It is important to emphasize that we do not deny word meaning, we only identify it with the contribution the word makes to the meaning of the sentence. We shall return to the question of word meaning after we have discussed sentence meaning.

6.3 Sentence Meaning

We accept a truth-based account of sentence meaning. According to this, what a declarative sentence means is the set of the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the sentence to be true. These are called the **truth conditions** of the sentence. Consider (5).

(5) *A boy saw a mouse.*

This sentence is true if and only if an individual that has the features which we attribute to boys (i.e. 'human', 'male', 'non-adult') perceived through his eyes another individual that has the features we attribute to mice, (i.e. 'small' 'rodent'). This set of conditions, which minimally guarantees that (5) is true, is the meaning of (5).

If, however, we replace the verb *saw* by the verb *killed*, as in (6), the sentence will have a different set of truth conditions, i.e. a different meaning: a boy ('human', 'male', 'non-adult') caused another individual, having the features that we attribute to mice (i.e. 'small', 'rodent'), to die.

(6) *A boy killed a mouse.*

Both (5) and (6) refer to different states of affairs, which can be true or false.

6.4 Sense Relations between Words

As we saw in (5) and (6), the contribution that a lexeme makes to the cognitive meaning of a sentence, i.e. the cognitive meaning (sense) of the lexeme, can be revealed if we replace a lexeme with another in a sentence and see whether the cognitive meaning of the sentence changes or not, and if it does change, how it changes. This activity involves a comparison of lexemes in terms of their contributions to the cognitive meaning of the sentence, i.e. in terms of their senses. The relationships between lexemes established on the basis of their senses are called **sense relations**.

One of these is **synonymy**, which means that two or more lexemes have the same cognitive meaning (even though they may differ stylistically), e.g. *damsel* (formal, archaic), *girl* (neutral), *bird* (informal). Since *girl* and *damsel* are cognitively synonymous, the sentences under (1) and (2), repeated here for your convenience as (7a) and (7b), are also synonymous, even though stylistically different. (7a) and (7b) must both be true or both be false.

(7) a. *The girl went to the garden.*

b. *The damsel made her way to the garden.*

Another sense relation is **ambiguity**, of which we distinguish two kinds, homonymy and polysemy. **Homonymy** (or perfect ambiguity) means that two or more phonologically and orthographically identical lexemes have completely different, unrelated meanings, e.g. *ball*¹ ('round object that you can throw or kick') vs. *ball*² ('social event at which you can dance'). Polysemy (or imperfect ambiguity) means that the meaning of one lexeme is metaphorically extended on the basis of some similarity, cf. *leg*¹ (of a man) vs. *leg*² (of a table).

It often happens that the metaphorical connection that once used to exist between such lexemes fades or is lost altogether and so what started out as a set of polysemous items becomes a set of homonymous items, cf. e.g. *horn*¹ ('the hard pointed part that grows on the head of cattle') vs. *horn*² ('kind of musical instrument played by blowing') vs. *horn*³ ('apparatus in a car which makes a loud warning sound'). Originally, a *horn*² was made of a *horn*¹, and a *horn*³ was a kind of *horn*², but many native speakers are no longer aware of this connection. The presence of an ambiguous lexeme in a sentence makes the sentence ambiguous, too. This is shown in (8a) and (8b).

(8) a. *We waited by the bank.* ('by the building of the financial institution').

b. *We waited by the bank.* ('by the riverside').

Another sense relation is **oppositeness** or **antonymy**, with subtypes called complementary, gradable and relational opposites. **Complementary opposites** are lexemes in such a relationship that the negation of the meaning of one lexeme gives us the meaning of the other, e.g. *dead* vs. *alive* (because 'not dead' means 'alive' and 'not-alive' means 'dead'). **Gradable opposites** are gradable lexemes, relative to some norm, e.g. *large* vs. *small*. (A small elephant is not a small animal, it is only small for an elephant, a large mouse is not a large animal, it is only large for a mouse.) More of one is less of the other, e.g. *smaller* means 'less large', *larger* means 'less small'. One member of gradable opposites is normally unmarked, the other is marked. It is the unmarked member that is used in questions of degree unless we have some good reason to use the other one; cf. *How old are you?* is unmarked, *How young are you?* is marked. **Relational opposites** are lexemes referring to symmetrically opposite aspects of the

same situation, cf. e.g. *employer* vs. *employee*. (If Peter employs you, you are his employee and he is your employer.) Replacing a lexeme by its opposite in a sentence causes the original sentence and the new sentence to have opposite or **incompatible meanings**. This means that they cannot both be true at the same time.

(9) a. *John is dead.*

b. *John is alive.*

The last sense relation we mention is **hyponymy** or **logical inclusion**. This is the relation between a cognitively superordinate, i.e. more general, lexeme and the more specific lexemes that are cognitively subordinated to it. For instance, *tulip, rose, daisy, carnation, lily, daffodil*, etc. are all hyponyms in relation to *flower* (and co-hyponyms in relation to one another), because the sets of semantic features that they all have include the feature 'flower'.

There are semantic features which are present in the sense of a number of lexemes, e.g. 'female' or [-male] is present in the nouns, proper names, verbs and adjectives enumerated in (10).

(10) a. *Tigress, doe, ewe, hen, mare, vixen, cow, actress, girl, queen, maiden, widow, nun, woman, sister, mother*

b. *Agnes, Sue, Eve*

c. *to give birth, to breastfeed*

d. *pregnant, buxom, etc.*

The noun phrase in (11a) and the sentence in (11b) are semantically anomalous because they attempt to reconcile incompatible semantic properties:

(11) a. *My brother called Sue.*

b. *My brother is pregnant.*

If, in a sentence, we replace a hyponym lexeme with its superordinate lexeme, the original, first sentence is said to **entail** the new one. One sentence entails another sentence if the truth of the first guarantees the truth of the second, and the falsity of the second guarantees the falsity of the first. For instance, (12a) entails (12b).

(Check this for yourself: if (12a) is true, is (12b) true, too? If (12b) is false, is (12a) false, too? If the answer to both questions is 'yes', then (12a) entails (12b).)

- (12) a. *Mary picked daisies.*
b. *Mary picked flowers.*

6.5 The Cognitive Meaning of Sentences

The cognitive meaning (or proposition) of a sentence depends on three factors. First, it depends on the cognitive meanings of the sentential constituents, whether these are content words such as *man*, *dog* and *kick*, or function words such as *the*, or proper names such as *Mr. Brown*, or affix-morphemes such as the past tense suffix {-ed}, cf. (13a) vs.(13b).

- (13) a. *Mr. Brown kicked the man.* ×
b. *Mr. Brown kicked the dog.*

Secondly, it depends on the functional labels that the constituents have, which is often, though not always, mirrored by the order of the constituents, cf. (14a) and (14b).

- (14) a. [(subject) *The sheriff*] kicked [(object) *the man*]. ×
b. [(subject) *The man*] kicked [(object) *the sheriff*].

Thirdly, the cognitive meaning of a sentence depends on its structure. In (15a) the adverb *fast* modifies both verbs, in (15b) it modifies only the second verb.

- (15) a. *They ((run and swim) fast).*
 b. *They (run and (swim fast)).*


As we talked about sense relations between lexemes, so we can talk about **proposition relations** between sentences. These are relations between sentences on the basis of their cognitive meanings.

1. Sentences can be **synonymous**, in this case they are each other's **paraphrases**. The synonymy of sentences may result from lexical synonymy, as we saw in (7a) and (7b) above. But sentential synonymy can also be achieved structurally, as in the active-passive pair in (16a) and (16b).


- (16) a. *The dog crossed the road.*
 b. *The road was crossed by the dog.*

2. Sentences can also be **ambiguous**. This means that two sentences are composed of the same constituents in the same order but they have different meanings. This again can have lexical reasons (one of the words being ambiguous), as in (8a) and (8b) above. Or, ambiguity can be caused by structural differences, as in (17a) and (17b).

- (17) a. *The sheriff killed the man with the gun.* ('The sheriff fired the gun at the man')



- b. *The sheriff killed the man with the gun.* ('The sheriff fired at the man who had the gun.')



Furthermore, ambiguity may also result from the different functions a particular constituent can perform, see (18a) and (18b).

- (18) a. [(subject) *The lamb*] is ready to eat. ('The lamb will eat.')
- b. [(object) *The lamb*] is ready to eat. ('Somebody will eat the lamb.')

Pragmatics, the Study of Language Use in Particular Situations

7.1 Pragmatics

Pragmatics is the study of various aspects of language use; it deals with the ways in which language-users use and interpret words and utterances in particular situations. By words and utterances we mean lexemes and sentences used in particular situations, and by situations we mean linguistic and physical contexts.

Pragmatics is not easy to separate from semantics and it is to some extent an arbitrary decision where we draw the line between them. The central concerns of the two, however, stand out fairly clearly. While semantics primarily examines the cognitive meaning of lexemes and sentences, pragmatics primarily examines what the speaker means by the lexemes (words) and sentences (utterances) used in particular situations; i.e. it is a study of intended “speaker meaning”.

We shall deal with the following aspects of language use: (a) the role of context and presuppositions, (b) language functions and speech acts, (c) conversational implicatures.

7.2 The Role of Context and Presuppositions

Ambiguous words and utterances are usually disambiguated by means of the **linguistic context**. In a narrow sense, the linguistic context is provided by the environment of the ambiguous word within the utterance, i.e. by the other words around the ambiguous word. For instance, although the lexemes BANK¹ ('riverside') and BANK² ('financial institution') are homonyms. They are not normally confusing when they occur in particular linguistic contexts, as in (1a) and (1b):

- (1) a. *The right bank of the River Danube in Budapest is nice and hilly.*
b. *The bank has announced an increase in interest rates.*

In a broader sense, the linguistic context comprises the other utterances around the ambiguous utterance within a discourse. By **discourse** we mean the physical product of language use in a particular situation; it consists of all the utterances made in the same situation. For example, although the sentence *The sheriff killed the man with the gun.* is ambiguous in itself, it gets disambiguated when uttered in different discourses, see (2a) and (2b).

- (2) a. *There were two people waiting for him round the corner: a man with a gun and a woman with a knife. The sheriff killed the man with the gun.*
b. *John gave the sheriff the gun the man had dropped. The sheriff killed the man with the gun.*

Another disambiguating factor is the **physical context**. For instance, when you see the word BANK written on the front of an elegant building in a city, you will know that what you see is not the edge of a river but an institution dealing with money matters. There are utterances containing pronouns and pronoun-like place- and time-adverbials which refer to

the personal, locational and temporal characteristics of the situation and whose meaning is relative to the situation, because they can be interpreted only if the speaker's immediate physical context is known. Such pronouns and pronoun-like elements are called **deictic expressions**. For instance, the underlined elements in (3) are deictic. The phenomenon of using deictic elements is known as **deixis**.

(3) *I'll have to do that next week because they're not here now.*

It can happen that a positive sentence and its negative counterpart both presuppose that a particular state of affairs (proposition) is true and known not only by the speaker but also by the hearer. This proposition is called a **presupposition**. A presupposition is a proposition that follows from both a positive sentence and its negative counterpart, and which both the speaker and the hearer assume to be true. For example, the presupposition of (4a) and (4b) is (5).

(4) a. *Your brother wants to see you.*

b. *Your brother doesn't want to see you.*

(5) *You have a brother.*

7.3 Language Functions and Speech Acts

One way of dealing with language use is in terms of **language functions**. It is customary to distinguish six types of language function.

1. The **cognitive function** (=propositional or descriptive function):

This is the communication of a state of affairs, e.g. *Today is Monday.* or *The table is in the middle of the room.*

2. The **expressive function** (= affective function):
This is the expression of the speaker's attitudes, feelings, emotions, e.g. *Damn! or Shit! or Oh!*
3. The **directive function**:
This is influencing the hearer's behaviour or attitude, e.g. *Come here! or Could you lend me two thousand dollars until Friday?*
4. The **phatic function**:
This is establishing and maintaining contact with the hearer, e.g. *Hi there., Nice to see you. or Can you follow me?*
5. The **metalinguistic function**:
Talking about language in order to clarify certain aspects of it, sometimes to ensure that communication can take place undisturbed, e.g. *The word "violin" is of Italian origin.*
6. The **poetic function** (= aesthetic function):
This is the use of language primarily for its own sake, i.e. for the pleasure it gives speaker and hearer through its sound and rhythm, rather than for performing any of the other functions, e.g. *Pat a cake, pat a cake, baker's man.*

A more recent classification of various types of language use has been provided by **speech act theory**, first propagated by the language philosophers Austin and Searle. The central notion in this theory is **illocutionary act**, which is the act the speaker performs in and while saying an utterance. An illocutionary act realises the speaker's communicative intention, which can be of hundreds of different kinds, e.g. asserting, stating, reporting, complaining, promising, inquiring, warning, suggesting, ordering, requesting, thanking, greeting, etc. Illocutionary acts can be made fully explicit if we use **performative verbs**. A performative verb is so called

because it explicitly performs an illocutionary act; i.e. it explicitly expresses the speaker's communicative intention, and as such it stands in the first person singular and can be prefixed by the adverb *hereby*. In some situations the use of the performative verb is obligatory. Consider the underlined verbs in (6), and (7), where the verbs *name* and *declare*, all in first person singular, present tense, indicative, carry out the very acts of naming, declaring and greeting.

(6) I *name* this ship the *Rainbow*.

(7) I *declare* the meeting open.

Of course, the performative verb need not be there in most cases, because the speaker's communicative intention can be obvious in the situation without making it explicit. Consider the sentences in (8), (9) and (10), in which the use of the performative verb is not obligatory. The verbs underlined in the (a) sentences are performative verbs and they explicitly carry out the illocutionary acts of asserting, suggesting and promising. But instead of the (a) sentences we may actually utter the (b) sentences; with these we can perform the same illocutionary acts as with their (a) counterparts.

(8) a. I (*hereby*) *assert* that he speaks excellent *English*.

b. He speaks excellent *English*.

(9) a. I (*hereby*) *suggest* that you should leave.

b. You should leave.

(10) a. I (*hereby*) *promise* that I'll be there.

b. I'll be there.

The identification of language functions or illocutionary acts depends on various factors and is not always easy, for several reasons.

1. First, functions or speech acts may overlap in an utterance. Take, for instance, the sentence *The door's too low*. This can simultaneously be a report, an assertion, a warning, and a complaint when you say it after you've hit your head against the door-bar and want to warn other people to mind their heads; i.e. it can simultaneously have a cognitive, expressive, directive and phatic function.
2. Secondly, functions and illocutionary acts are not consistently matched by sentence forms. The same grammatical form can be used in a wide variety of different functions or speech acts. The imperative, for example, can be used in giving advice, suggestions, commands, demands, prayers, requests, etc. Conversely, the same functional category or speech act can be realized by a wide variety of different forms. For instance, the sentences in (12) can all be interpreted as expressions of the same directive function or persuasive act.

- (12) a. *I'd leave if I were you.*
b. *You ought to leave.*
c. *You'd better leave.*
d. *I hope you leave.*
e. *I want you to leave.*
f. *Why don't you leave?*
g. *When are you leaving?*
h. *It's time you left.*
i. *Please, leave.*

Out of these (12i), *Please, leave.*, can be called a **direct speech act** because it is realized by the most obvious linguistic means, the imperative. The others are **indirect speech acts** because they use syntactic structures that are more usually associated with other acts.

3. Thirdly, the interpretation of the function or illocutionary act represented by an utterance requires knowledge of the situation (physical and linguistic context) in which the utterance is made. Consider, for example, the sentence *Can you play the piano?* This counts as an ordinary question if you say it to someone in a room where there is no piano and the conversation is about who can play what musical instrument. But it will count as a request to play if it is said to someone who is known to be a good pianist, in a room where there is a piano. In other words, we simply cannot say what the function or illocution of a sentence is if we take it in isolation from the context or situation in which it is uttered.

7.4 Conversational Implicatures, Grice's Maxims

When we establish the “speaker meaning” of a sentence uttered in a particular situation, we rely, among other things, on **conversational implicatures**. These are implications following from the utterance on the basis of **Grice's maxims** (named so after Grice, the philosopher who invented them). Two of Grice's maxims are (13a) and (13b):

- (13) a. Grice's maxim 1: Make your contribution as informative as is required but not more informative than is required.
- b. Grice's maxim 2: Be relevant.

Consider, for instance, the response by Speaker B in (14).

(14) Speaker A: *Have you cleaned your room and done the shopping?*

Speaker B: *I have cleaned my room.*

On the basis of maxim (13a), we may rightfully assume that the implicature is: *I have not done the shopping*, i.e. this

is how we can interpret Speaker B's utterance in the given context. This interpretation, however, is not necessarily correct and can be cancelled, as is shown in (15).

(15) Speaker A: *Have you cleaned your room and done the shopping?*

Speaker B: *I have cleaned my room.*

Speaker A: *So you haven't done the shopping.*

Speaker B: *Oh, yes, I've done the shopping, too.*

The last example is the exchange in (16).

(16) Speaker A: *The doorbell rang.*

Speaker B: *I'm in the bath.*

In the given situation the first utterance, by Speaker A, can only be understood as a request towards Speaker B to go and answer the door. However, Speaker B is in the bath, and his response, on the basis of maxim (13b), can only be interpreted as *I can't go, so please go yourself*.

CHAPTER 8

Language Variation

8.1 The Identity and Variability of Language

A natural language is not just one homogeneous code. Any natural language in the world exists in several varieties at the same time. All these varieties have their own sets of rules: all of them are codes for those sections of the community that use them. The existence of language varieties side by side is called **language variation** (= synchronic variability). Moreover, the coexisting varieties are in a constant change along the dimension of time, too, this phenomenon is called **language change** (= diachronic variability).

The first question we have to discuss briefly is the problem of **language identity**, viz. what makes us decide whether two linguistic codes are two separate languages or just varieties of one language? One may say the criterion is mutual understandability, but this often breaks down between codes that are regarded as belonging to the same language (e.g. northern Chinese speakers and southern Chinese speakers do not necessarily understand each other's speech), moreover, it can bring together codes that

are regarded as separate languages (e.g. Swedes and Danes often understand each other's speech fairly well). Therefore we have to admit that mutual understandability is not a safe criterion. Language identity is a socio-psychological concept, one language is the sum of all the varieties that their users are culturally and politically conditioned to regard as one and the same language. (There is, thus, a certain amount of truth in the humorous saying: "a language is a dialect with an army and a navy".) So English, like any other natural language, is an abstraction, it is a cover term for all the linguistic codes that are, or have been, or will be, regarded as English. It refers to a bundle of partly similar, partly different codes: "Englishes".

In this chapter we deal with language variation, i.e. the simultaneously existing varieties of English. Since these varieties constitute a particular aspect of the relations between language and society, you can regard this chapter as a preliminary introduction to **sociolinguistics**, as well. Language variation can be discussed in terms of user-related and use-related variation.

8.2 User-related Variation: Dialect, Sociolect, Pidgin, Creole, Child Language, Gender Differences

The most obvious user-related language varieties involve the user's geographical and social position. The variety of a language which is used in a certain geographical area is called **regional dialect** or just **dialect**, for short. Dialects may differ in vocabulary, pronunciation and even morphology and syntax. The boundaries between dialects are not as clearcut as political boundaries or topographical features. They can be established by collecting linguistic features characteristic of the area. The line marking the limit of the distribution of a

linguistic feature on a map is called an isogloss. For instance, in a particular area within the state of Pennsylvania (USA), the local word for 'drought' is *drooth*. The line drawn around this area on the map is an isogloss. Other language features observed in this area may have slightly different geographical distributions, so the isoglosses based on these other features will not necessarily perfectly coincide with the isogloss for *drooth* but there will be considerable overlap between them. A dialect is a more or less congruent bundle of isoglosses.

It often happens that one of the regional varieties gains socialpolitical priority over the others and becomes the **standard variety** (or prestige variety), which is used for education, scholarship and state administration all over the country. The standard variety is no longer restricted to the geographical area where it was originally used but is associated with people who are educated, who are at the top of the socio-cultural scale, no matter where they live. The standard is no longer a regional dialect, it is rather a **social dialect**, or **sociolect**. A sociolect is a variety of language used by people in the same sociocultural position.

It is important to emphasize that the standard variety has a higher social prestige, but is not linguistically better than the other varieties. For instance, **Standard English** was originally a regional dialect used in the South-East of England and its emergence as the standard was accidental from a linguistic point of view. The fact that it was this particular variety rather than a northern variety that became the standard is due to historical, political, cultural, economic reasons (think of the significance, in this respect, of the capital city and the great universities in the region). Standard English has two major national subvarieties, Standard British and Standard American, neither of which is linguistically superior to the other.

The two display remarkable uniformity, the greatest difference between them is probably in pronunciation. The ideal type of pronunciation of Standard British English is called **Received Pronunciation**, or RP (so called because by the 19th century this had become the only socially acceptable pronunciation in polite society in England, notably the pronunciation of those people who were received at court). The pronunciation associated with Standard American English is called **General American**, or GA.

Standard British English, with its RP, is the language of the educated people at the top of the socio-cultural scale in Britain. The lower you go along this scale, the more you find that people mix the standard with dialectal (regional, local) features on the one hand, and with sociolectal (non-regional) features that generally characterise the language of less educated people on the other hand. Those near the bottom of the socio-cultural scale nearly always use **non-standard** varieties, which may coincide with regional dialects but may also cut across dialect boundaries. Here are a few examples: *He want it., I wants it., That was the man has done it., He don't know nothing., I ain't got no car.*, etc. (The last two examples illustrate **double or multiple negation**, a nonstandard sociolectal feature used by uneducated English speakers in very different geographical areas.) One must not think, however, that examples of this sort are incorrect. They simply belong to other codes than the standard. They are perfectly well-formed within the varieties to which they belong and obey the rules of those varieties. (This is why the derogatory label *substandard* is unjustified and should be avoided. We recommend the use of *non-standard*, instead.)

A third type of user-related language variation is **pidgin**. A pidgin is usually the simplified version of a European language,

containing features of one or more local languages, used for occasional communication between people with no common language, in West Africa or in the Far East. For example, Melanesian Pidgin English (called *Tok Pisin*) is used in Australian New Guinea and the nearby islands. While a pidgin is not a native language, it can become the native language of a community (e.g. through intermarriage between people who have been brought together on a plantation from different linguistic backgrounds, and who have the pidgin as the only common language they can use for communication with one another). When a pidgin becomes the native language of a community, it is called a **creole**. For instance, in Jamaica, in addition to Standard English, there exist several kinds of Creole English.

Finally, one could add to the list of user-related varieties the linguistic features that are attributable to the age and sex of the language user. Apart from the features of **child language**, however, such features are not sufficiently systematic to form clearly identifiable varieties. For instance, although one can spot a few features that tend to occur more often in the language of female speakers than in the language of male speakers (and vice versa), it would be unjustified to separate feminine and masculine varieties of English.

8.3 Use-related Variation: Spoken and Written Varieties, Styles, Registers

There are different types of use-related language variation. The first type of use-related variation is conditioned by the **medium** of language use, i.e. by speech and writing. The language we speak is generally different from the language we write. When we write, we are often more careful and use longer sentences because the addressee is not present and so

cannot rely on the situation (physical context), but can always go back to the beginning of the sentence and read it again if necessary. But it seems that a finer distinction of media is required because there are different subtypes of speech and different subtypes of writing, and these differences trigger corresponding linguistic differences. For instance, the language we use in face-to-face talks tends to differ from the language of public lectures, which in turn is very different from the language of telephone conversations. Or, the language of text-messages on your mobile phone is clearly different from the language of your personal letters, though both are written varieties.

The second type of use-related variation is **style**. This is conditioned by the language users' relative social status and attitude towards their interlocutors (e.g. they can talk to equals, to people in higher or lower social positions, to older or younger people, to children, they may talk to someone who they have never seen before or to someone who is an old friend of theirs, etc.) We recognize a **neutral** or unmarked style, which does not show any obvious coloring brought about by relative social status and attitude. On either side of this we can distinguish sentences which are markedly formal or informal. Compare the sentences in (1).

- (1) a. Formal: I wonder if you'd mind switching off the light.
b. Neutral: Would you please switch off the light?
c. Informal: Switch off the light, will you?

Formal style is usually impersonal and polite, used in public speeches, serious polite talk, serious writing (official reports, regulations, legal and scientific texts, business letters, etc.). A very formal style can be called **rigid**, it is nearly always written and standard. **Informal** (= colloquial) style characterizes private conversations, personal letters between

intimates and popular newspapers. A very informal style can be called **familiar**, this may involve the use of nonstandard features, four-letter words, and slang expressions. **Slang** can be defined as very informal language, with a vocabulary composed typically of coinages and arbitrarily changed words, such as the ones often created by young speakers. Some slang expressions are associated with particular groups of people, so we can distinguish e.g. army slang, school slang, etc., to this extent slang is partly user-related. After a time, some slang expressions die out or become old-fashioned, e.g. *to take a shufti at something* ('to take a look at something'), but some may pass into ordinary colloquialism (i.e. informal standard), e.g. *to slag someone off* ('to criticise someone') is a British slang expression half-way towards becoming a standard vocabulary item.

When we use language, we must use sentences that are not only grammatical and meaningful but also **stylistically appropriate**, i.e. matching the stylistic requirements of the situation. For instance, the sentence *Be seated.* is perfectly grammatical and meaningful, but would be ridiculously inappropriate if we said it to a friend of ours in our home (unless we wanted to sound humorous).

The third type of use-related language variation is **register**, which is conditioned by the subject matter in connection with which the language is being used. Each field of interest, activity, occupation is associated with a special vocabulary, and it is mainly these vocabulary differences that underlie the different registers. Thus we can talk about the registers of sports, religion, medicine, computer engineering, cookery, weather forecasts, etc. Think, for example, of the word *shotputting*, which is hardly ever used outside the sports register, or the word *blackboard*, which is only used in the

register of school teaching. When the register of a field is full of technical terms which those who have received no training in that field cannot understand, it is referred to as **jargon** (think e.g. of the jargon of computer engineers or the jargon of linguists). Criminals' jargon can be called **argot** or **cant**. Since the most frequent and most favourite topics of one's speech or writing are related to one's occupation, registers are partly user-related, too.

8.4 Idiolect, Code Switching, Diglossia

The total of all the varieties of a language that a person knows is the person's idiolect. An **idiolect**, then, is the amount of a language that an individual possesses. The ability to change from one variant to another is **code switching**. For instance, a doctor switches codes when he speaks of a bone as *tibia* to his colleagues in the hospital and as *shinbone* to his family at home.

It can happen that two distinct varieties of a language co-occur in a speech community, one with a high social prestige (such as e.g. Standard English, learnt at school, used in church, on radio programmes, in serious literature, and generally on formal occasions), and one with a low social prestige (e.g. a local dialect, used in family conversations and other informal situations). The sociolinguistic term for this situation is **diglossia**, and an individual having diglossia is a **diglossic**. (These terms are not to be confused with **bilingualism** and **bilingual**, which mean 'knowledge of two languages' and 'person knowing two languages', respectively.)

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Glossary

Allophone

Any of the speech sounds that represent a single phoneme, such as the aspirated k in kit and the unaspirated k in skit, which are allophones of the phoneme k.

Allomorph

Any of the versions of a morpheme, such as the plural endings s (as in bats), z (as in bugs), and iz (as in buses) for the plural morpheme.

Arbitrariness

The absence of any natural or necessary connection between a word meaning and its sound or form.

Bound Morpheme

A word element that cannot stand alone as a word, including both prefixes and suffixes.

Bracketing

A way of representing the structure of an expression by writing square brackets (‘[’ and ‘]’) to the left and right hand side of its component parts, i.e. words or constituents.

Codability

The ability to be coded.

Communicative Competence

A term in linguistics which refers to a language user's grammatical knowledge of syntax, morphology, phonology and the like, as well as social knowledge about how and when to use utterances appropriately.

Comparative Philology

(Comparative Linguistics) A branch of historical linguistics that is concerned with comparing languages to establish their historical relatedness.

Competence

An idealized capacity that is located as a psychological or mental property or function.

Complementary Distribution

The mutually exclusive relationship between two phonetically similar segments. It exists when one segment occurs in an environment where the other segment never occurs.

Computational Linguistics

An interdisciplinary field concerned with the statistical or rule-based modeling of natural language from a computational perspective, as well as the study of appropriate computational approaches to linguistic questions.

Corpus

A collection of written texts, especially the entire works of a particular author or a body of writing on a particular subject.

Cultural Transmission

The process whereby a language is passed on from one generation to the next.

Descriptive Linguistics

The study of the grammar, classification, and arrangement of the features of a language at a given time, without reference to the history of the language or comparison with other languages.

Descriptivism

Related to, or based on descriptive grammar or descriptive linguistics.

Descriptivist

A writer, teacher, or supporter of descriptive grammar or descriptive linguistics.

Determiner

A member of a subclass of English limiting adjectival words that usually precede descriptive adjectives and include the articles *the*, *a*, and *an*, and any words that may substitute for them, *as your*, *their*, *some*, and *each*.

Double Articulation

The way in which the stream of speech can be divided into meaningful signs, which can be further subdivided into meaningless elements.

Discreteness

It refers to the uniqueness of the sounds used in human languages. Every language use a set of different sounds. Each of these sounds is different from the rest and are combined to form new meanings

Displacement

The capability of language to communicate about things that are not immediately present (spatially or temporally); i.e., things that are either not here or are not here now.

Distinctive Feature

The most basic unit of phonological structure that may be analyzed in phonological theory.

D-Structure

(Deep Structure) A theoretical construct that seeks to unify several related structures.

E-Language

(External Language) The observable language outside people's mind. It is the language that people actually produce as it is perceived.

Emic Approach

The analysis of behavioral and cultural systems is defined in terms that are meaningful to the individual who is a participant within that culture, also known as an "insider's view".

Ethnolinguistics

(Cultural Linguistics) The field of linguistics which studies the relationship between language and culture, and the way different ethnic groups perceive the world.

Etic Approach

A logical, analytical and anthropological analysis of one who does not participate in the cultural that is being observed.

Free Morpheme

A word element that can stand alone.

Forensic Linguistics

The application of linguistic knowledge, methods and insights to the forensic context of law, language, crime investigation, trial, and judicial procedure.

FOXP2 Gene

A protein that, in humans is required for proper development of speech and language.

Generative Grammar

A type of grammar that describes a language in terms of a set of logical rules formulated so as to be capable of generating the infinite number of possible sentences of that language and providing them with the correct structural description.

Generative Linguistics

The cover term for the formalist linguistic theories that were developed by Noam A. Chomsky, or inspired by his writings.

Grice's Maxim

A cooperative principle which describes how effective communication in conversation is achieved in common social situations.

Historical Linguistics

(Diacronic Linguistics) The scientific study of language change over time.

Iconic Sign

A sign which resembles or imitates its signified object in that it possesses some of its qualities.

I-Language

(Internal Language) The internal linguistic knowledge in the mind of every speaker.

Interchangeability

It refers to the idea that humans can give and receive identical linguistic signals; humans are not limited in the types of messages they can say/hear.

Language Change

The variation over time in a language's phonological, morphological, semantic, syntactic, and other features.

Language Pedagogy

Theories and practices related to teaching second, foreign or heritage languages in a variety of institutional, cultural and political contexts.

Language Variation

A term used to describe that between the speakers of any language there is variation in the way that they use their language.

Langue

The whole system of language that precedes and makes speech possible.

Linguist

a person who studies linguistics.

Linguistics

The scientific study of language and its structure, including the study of morphology, syntax, phonetics, and semantics.

Linguistic Competence

The system of linguistic knowledge possessed by native speakers of a language.

Linguistic Determinism

The idea that language and its structures limit and determine human knowledge or thought, as well as thought processes such as categorization, memory, and perception.

Linguistic Performance

The actual use of language in concrete situations.

Linguistic Relativism

A view that the structure of a language affects its speakers' world view or cognition.

Morpheme

A meaningful morphological unit of a language that cannot be further divided (e.g., in, come, -ing, forming incoming).

Morph

A sequence of phonemes constituting a minimal unit of grammar or syntax, and, as such, a representation, member, or contextual variant of a morpheme in a specific environment.

Morphology

The study of words, how they are formed, and their relationship to other words in the same language.

Neurolinguistics

The study of the neural mechanisms in the human brain that control the comprehension, production, and acquisition of language.

Noun Phrase

A phrase which has a noun (or indefinite pronoun) as its head word, or which performs the same grammatical function as such a phrase.

Onomatopoeia

The formation of a word from a sound associated with what is named (e.g., cuckoo, sizzle).

Paradigmatic Relationship

A relation that holds between elements of the same category, i.e. elements that can be substituted for each other.

Parole

the concrete use of the language, the actual utterances. It is an external manifestation of langue.

Performance

The production of actual utterances.

Prescriptivism

The attitude or belief that one variety of a language is superior to others and should be promoted as such.

Phoneme

One of the units of sound that distinguish one word from another in a particular language.

Phonemic Transcription

The visual representation of speech sounds (or phones).

Phonetics

A branch of linguistics that comprises the study of the sounds of human speech, or—in the case of sign languages—the equivalent aspects of sign.

Phonology

A branch of linguistics concerned with the systematic organization of sounds in languages.

Polyglots

People with the ability to master, or the state of having mastered, multiple languages.

Pragmatics

A subfield of linguistics and semiotics that studies the ways in which context contributes to meaning.

Productivity

The degree to which native speakers use a particular grammatical process, especially in word formation.

Psycholinguistics

The study of the psychological and neurobiological factors that enable humans to acquire, use, comprehend and produce language

Semantics

The linguistic and philosophical study of meaning, in language, programming languages, formal logics, and semiotics.

Sociolinguistics

The descriptive study of the effect of any and all aspects of society, including cultural norms, expectations, and context, on the way language is used, and society's effect on language.

Specialization

A type of semantic change by which the meaning of a word becomes less general or inclusive than its earlier meaning.

S-Structure

(Surface Structure) The final stage in the syntactic representation of a sentence, which provides the input to the phonological component of the grammar, and which thus most closely corresponds to the structure of the sentence we articulate and hear.

Structural Linguistics

A study of language based on the theory that language is a structured system of formal units such as sentences and syntax.

Signifier

The form of a sign. The form might be a sound, a word, a photograph, a facial expression, a painting of a pipe, etc.

Signified

The concept or object that's represented. The concept or object might be an actual pipe, the command to stop, a warning of radioactivity.

Symbolic Sign

A sign which has no resemblance between the signifier and the signified. The connection between them must be culturally learned.

Syntagmatic Relationship

It refers to the relationship a word has with other words that surround it.

Syntax

The study of the rules for the formation of grammatical sentences in a language.

Traditional Grammar

The collection of rules and concepts about the structure of language that is commonly taught in schools.

Tree Diagram

A way of representing the hierarchical nature of a structure in a graphical form.

Verb Phrase

A syntactic unit composed of at least one verb and its dependents—objects, complements and other modifiers—but not always including the subject.

Index

A

Allophones; 66, 67
Allomorph; 72, 75
Arbitrariness; 4

B

Bound Morpheme; 74
Bracketings; 49, 83

C

Codability; 46
Communicative
 Competence; 18, 20,
 21, 24, 26
Communicative
 Performance; 22, 24,
 25, 26
Comparative Philology; 41,
 43
Competence; 5, 17, 19, 52,
 54, 91,
Complementary
 Distribution; 47, 66, 72
Computational Linguistics;
 6
Corpus; 47, 54

Cultural Transmission; 4

D

Descriptive Linguistics; 11,
 44
Descriptivism; 10, 12
Descriptivist; 11, 45
Determiner; 49, 83
Double Articulation; 3
Discreteness; 4
Displacement; 4
Distinctive Feature; 9, 67,
 68
D-Structure; 50

E

E-Language; 3, 42, 47, 54
Emic Approach; 67, 73
Ethnolinguistics; 6
Etic Approach; 67, 73

F

Free Morpheme; 73, 75
Forensic Linguistics; 6
Feminine; 7, 76, 116
FOXP2 Gene; 39

- G**
 Generative Grammar; 9,
 10, 50, 52
 Generative Linguistics; 3,
 49, 50, 53, 55, 67
 Grammatical Competence,
 17, 22, 23, 24
 Grice's Maxims; 110
- H**
 Historical Linguistics; 6, 8,
 10
- I**
 Iconic Sign; 14
 I-Language; 3, 52, 53, 54
 Interchangeability; 4
- L**
 Language Change; 41, 42,
 112
 Language Pedagogy; 6
 Language Variation; 112,
 115, 116, 118
 Langue; 43, 52
 Linguist; 45, 47, 51, 54
 Linguistics; 2, 5, 7, 10, 42,
 44, 49, 54, 67
 Linguistic Competence; 20,
 21, 24, 25, 26
 Linguistic Determinism; 45,
 46
 Linguistic Performance; 26
 Linguistic Relativism; 45
- M**
 Masculine; 7, 116
 Modern Linguistics; 41, 42,
 44, 55
 Morpheme; 47, 70, 72, 74,
 75, 76
 Morph; 72
 Morphology; 5, 47, 70, 113
- N**
 Neurolinguistics; 6
 Neutrum; 7
 Noun Phrase; 49, 52, 80,
 82, 100
- O**
 Onoma; 7
 Onomatopoeia; 31
- P**
 Paradigmatic Relationship;
 43, 44, 47, 67
 Parole; 43, 52, 54
 Performance; 17, 18, 23,
 52, 53, 54, 91
 Perscriptivism; 10, 12
 Phoneme; 27, 44, 47, 56,
 64
 Phonemic Transcription;
 66, 67
 Phonetics; 5, 47, 56, 57,
 59, 63,
 Phonologist; 9
 Phonology; 9, 25, 47, 57,
 64, 67
 Polyglots; 5
 Pragmatics; 6, 22, 93, 104
 Productivity; 3

Psycholinguistics; 6, 553

R

Rhema; 7

S

Semantics; 6, 93, 104

Shibboleth; 11

Sociolinguistics; 6, 113

Sociolinguistic

 Competence; 24

Specialization; 4

S-Structure; 50

Structuralism; 8, 10, 47

Structuralist Linguistics; 3,
50

Symbolic Sign; 13

Symptomatic; 13

Syndesmoi; 7

Syntagmatic Relationship,
43

Syntax; 5, 10, 80, 113

T

Traditional Grammar, 40,
41, 43, 71

Transformations; 10, 50

Tree Diagrams; 49, 83

U

Universal Grammar; 51,
52, 54

V

Verb Phrase; 49, 81

About the Writer



Taufik Hidayah was born in Jember, East Java, Indonesia. He has been teaching English from 2008 to present. He feels lucky to have the experience of teaching students from different background and education level, from elementary school to university level. His passion in English teaching has rewarded him a Fulbright scholarship in 2014 and by the end of 2015 he obtained a master degree of TESOL from Arizona State University, The United States. He then continued his passion working as a lecturer, a TOEFL instructor and an English tutor at some institutions in East Java

AN INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTICS

This book is addressed to those interested in English Linguistics, including those whose primary area of interest is English as a second language, primary or secondary-school English education, English literature, theoretical and applied linguistics. For this reason, it emphasizes on the theory of linguistics and all the related disciplines under the term linguistics. Furthermore, the book does not assume any background in language or linguistics. Readers are required to learn the International Phonetic Alphabet as well as the technical vocabulary of grammar and linguistics, but all necessary terms and concepts are presented in the book. Upon completion of this book, you will have acquired the following:

1. An understanding of the term language and its theory of origin;
2. A comprehension on the term linguistics and its development from time to time;
3. A knowledge of the sound system of contemporary English;
4. An understanding of the formation of English words and of their grammatical modification;
5. Comprehension of the structure of both simple and complex sentences in English;
6. A recognition of complexities in the expression of meaning, on both the word and sentence level;
7. An understanding of the effects of context and function of use upon the structure of the language; and
8. A knowledge on the language variations in real life environment.

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